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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has been growing at a frenetic pace in the last few
years.1 An increasing number of people are using the Internet for
routine tasks such as communication, entertainment, work, and
shopping. As a result, Internet markets have experienced vigorous
growth as more consumers gain access to the Internet. 2 Despite the
effect of the stock market shock experienced by many commercial
websites, the importance of Internet markets is not expected to decline
in the coming years. 3 Indeed, government statistics predict a rapid
increase in the number of households logging onto cyberspace,
contributing further to the growing importance of these markets.4
Since its origin, the main characteristic of the Internet has been its
relatively unregulated character. 5 The Internet may be considered
1. Press Release, Computer Industry Almanac Inc., 625 Million Computers-in-use Year-end
2001 (July 15, 2001), available at http://www.c-i-a.com/pr07Ol.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2003).
"According to the Computer Industry Almanac there will be over 625 million computers-in-use
by year-end 2001-up from 551.1 million computers-in-use at year-end 2000. The U.S. is
projected to have over 182 million computers-in-use or 30.64% of the total in year 2000." Id.
2. See NAT'L TELECOMMS. AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FALLING
THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION, at xv (Oct. 2000) [hereinafter DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET], available at http://search.ntia.doc.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003). The growth in the Internet in the last few years has been remarkable.
As a recent government survey concluded, "[t]he share of households with Internet access soared
by 58% [since the last survey], rising from 26.2% in December 1998 to 41.5% in August 2000."
Id. The survey goes on to state that "[m]ore than half of all households (51.0%) have computers,
up from 42.1% in December 1998." Id.
3. See Robert D. Hof, Why Tech Will Bloom Again, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Aug. 25, 2003,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_34/b3846605.htm ("[M]ore than 20 million
U.S. homes have broadband connections. As fast Net access takes off, it will spark altogether
new ways of using the Internet that w'ere just beginning to imagine today."); Greg Ip, Though
Nasdaq Was Massacred, Dow, S&P 500 Declines Missed Measuring Stick for Bear Market,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2001, at Rl, R6, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2849786 (explaining how the
stock market behaved for Internet companies during the year 2000).
4. See DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET, supra note 2, at 89 (offering
statistics on the projected growth of the Internet).
5. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEx. L. REv. 447, 447 (2000) (book
review). Professor Netanel comments on this characteristic:
In the eyes of its visionary pioneers, the Internet constituted a new kind of global
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unregulated, in at least an everyday sense, when compared to entities in
the real world.6 As a result, many Internet users hope that it remains
free from government intervention and that users develop their own
rules to regulate behavior and actions in cyberspace. 7 Nevertheless, the
growing importance of markets and commercial activities on the
Internet has generated concern among many scholars, policymakers,
and consumers who see the Internet as an environment that needs some
regulation to improve its performance.8 In addition, new forms of
private Internet regulation have emerged, such as BBB Online,
PricewaterhouseCoopers' BetterWeb, and the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"). The debate about Internet
governance mechanisms has begun to grow as fast as the Internet itself,
and while the need for regulation is increasing, the strengths and
weaknesses of the relevant regulatory regimes remain unclear in the
absence of detailed, formal analysis.
community. The early Internet seemed to operate by a loose, informal consensus. It
arose from universally accepted technical protocols for carrying on electronic
conversation from remote locations and times, and it gave birth to common language,
culture, and norms. Above all, its founders believed, the "Net" stood for the
proposition that "information wants to be free."
Id.
6. This is not to say that there was no regulation at all. Technology helps to define the rules of
the Internet and determines its regulatory framework. See Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and
the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to "Private"
Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1264-65 (2000) (providing an analysis of this type of
regulation).
7. See WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 2 (July 1, 1997), available at http://www.itmweb.com/essay541.htm
(last visited Oct. 27, 2003). The Clinton administration's report on establishing a global internet
market supports this idea:
Though government played a role in financing the initial development of the Internet,
its expansion has been driven primarily by the private sector. For electronic commerce
to flourish, the private sector must continue to lead. Innovation, expanded services,
broader participation, and lower prices will arise in a market-driven arena, not in an
environment that operates as a regulated industry.
Id.
8. Some authors note that particular Internet practices are already illegal. See, e.g., Jeff
Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1305, 1357 (2001) (arguing that "common information practices-collecting transactional
information about consumers and selling it to others without the knowledge or consent of the
affected consumers-violates both the FTC Act and state statutes").
In addition, several academics have contributed to the debate concerning government versus
private regulation. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
(1999); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the
APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000) [hereinafter Froomkin, Wrong Turn]; David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1367 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395 (2000) [hereinafter Netanel, Self-Governance].
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This Article analyzes the effectiveness and limitations of private
entity regulation of electronic commerce. It concentrates on the
regulation of e-commerce and the improvement of regulatory regimes
on the Internet through attempts to increase the overall social welfare of
both firms and consumers. My analysis relies on detailed case studies
on the regulation of (a) online privacy rights by BBBOnline and (b)
Internet domain names and addresses by ICANN. In putting together
these case studies, I have relied exclusively on publicly available
information. 9  I study the advantages and disadvantages of each
regulatory regime and consider the problems faced by both types of
institutions in efficiently managing a regulatory system.
I then demonstrate how government involvement could improve this
system. I argue that the failure of these private, third party institutions
("TPIs") to create a regulatory framework for the Internet is proof of the
need for a carefully defined government role. Based on the insights
from the case studies, I then define this role for government as one that
is intended to solve problems in the self-regulatory approach by setting
minimum baseline standards for regulatory issues such as online
privacy, preventing the capture of private regulators through meaningful
oversight, increasing the participation of firms in private regulatory
initiatives, and also serving as the enforcer of last resort.
At the Conference, to provide a theoretical context to the case
studies, I presented a larger project that includes a generalized model for
an economic transaction on the Internet. In his commentary, Professor
Froomkin argues that there are different markets that operate on the
Internet: one market for commodities, another for services, another for
markets and institutions, and still another for digitized data.
Accordingly, he suggests that the analysis should be different for every
one of these markets.10
I do not disagree with the fact that if we want to study any of these
markets there are different factors and particular structures that need to
be taken into account. However, the theoretical model presented at the
Conference that Professor Froomkin refers to does not concentrate on
any particular market but instead focuses on an economic transaction.
This model, like many theoretical models in the economics literature, is
not specific with respect to a given market but is general enough to have
9. I do not address the constitutional due process and administrative law concerns that are
implicated by the design and U.S. government oversight of private regulatory entities like
ICANN.
10. A. Michael Froomkin, Commentary: Time to Hug a Bureaucrat, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 139,
142-43 (2003).
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the particularities of many markets. In this model, one can consider any
transaction that takes place on the Internet.
It follows that a given transaction has different characteristics beyond
the particular structure of each market. These characteristics are
specifically incorporated into the model, and if you take any example of
any good, service or data exchanged on the Internet or in the real world,
it will involve these characteristics. For example, if you want to buy
some database software on the Internet, the result of the transaction will
depend on the market structure (which appears to be the only factor that
Professor Froomkin refers to), the definition and enforcement of
property rights, government regulation, technology, transaction costs,
informal and formal rules, and the like.
Accordingly, if you want to study a particular market, you will have
to take into account the specific characteristics of that market. That
does not mean that there is nothing insightful to be gained by examining
a general model for any economic transaction in any market, either on
the Internet or in the real world. These types of models that concentrate
on a general framework of an economic transaction have been widely
used in economics. A case study takes this general framework and then
looks at the different characteristics of a specific market, such as the
privacy rights market. In the same way, you can take any of the
markets mentioned by Professor Froomkin and analyze them following
the guidelines of a more general model.
Professor Froomkin focuses on the particularities of a given market,
which are just part of the general framework that focuses on an
economic transaction, and indeed, are what make it possible. For
example, you will not be secure engaging in any transaction in any of
the markets proposed by Professor Froomkin if there are not secure
property rights for both parties. Accordingly, even if property rights
enforcement can vary depending on a specific market on the Internet, it
is nevertheless a general characteristic of any transaction, and it is
possible to draw meaningful conclusions about the relationship between
secure property rights and the possibility of engaging in economic
transactions. Of course, in order to employ a general model to a
specific market, we should consider a particular market, define its
characteristics, and then determine how they affect the general
conditions for market transactions.
The two case studies are not general enough to fully justify or explain
the general model. But such a general model, which takes into account
institutional factors, has been used to study diverse industries and
markets. That is why a general model is constrained by the particular
characteristics of the privacy market on the Internet. We can then
2003]
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concentrate on one such market and derive policy implications from a
general model. However, one cannot claim then that every market will
exhibit the same result. Instead, the very same model can be applied in
further studies of other Internet markets. On one hand, you do not need
to evaluate every market to demonstrate that your theory is viable-that
is why theories are falsifiable. In the Conference in Chicago, I
proposed a theoretical framework and then applied it to the case of
privacy rights and ICANN's Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-
Resolution Policy ("UDRP"), and then showed that cooperation
between the private sector and public sector is the best outcome from
the social welfare standpoint (and yes, in agreement with Professor
Froomkin, that may include hugging a bureaucrat who functions in a
carefully defined role). Extending this work further to answer what
might happen in other markets on the Internet can be studied with the
same general setup, without necessarily reaching the same conclusions.
In his commentary, Professor Froomkin suggests that this Article
may be depicting the Internet as a thing apart, a space of its own.11 That
is simply not the case. The general economic approach that I have
described above is equally applicable to all markets, on the Internet and
the real world. The Internet is not an arena that is sui generis, but it
does have many characteristics that may qualitatively and quantitatively
differentiate it from other markets or technologies, such as the
telephone. Markets do work similarly on the Internet and in the
physical world, but the Internet may render many government
regulations less effective or useless for regulating electronic commerce.
For example, in the tax context, consider the problem of how to tax
Internet transactions without losing Internet companies to other tax
friendly jurisdictions. This effect exists in real markets, but, given the
global accessibility of the Internet, such an effect will tend to be
multiplied.
In his commentary, Professor Froomkin relates the buying of a bonsai
tree through the Internet as compared to buying it by phone.' 2 Even if I
assume that the two alternatives are the same, this result could be true
only if one thinks of just the U.S. market and not international markets.
If you can access foreign markets, then applicable regulations change,
property rights may be defined differently, jurisdictions are different,
norms change, market structure changes, and in the case of the Internet,
all types of institutions and regulations for foreign trade are absent.
You can buy a bonsai tree in the United States, and if you have any
11. Id. at 144.
12. Id. at 148.
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problems you can obtain redress through the courts. However, if you
buy the bonsai tree from a firm in a foreign country, you may have
problems getting similar redress for any loss from that transaction. In
addition, jurisdictions are not well-established and the transaction costs
involved are uncertain.
II. CASE STUDIES: PRIVACY RIGHTS TPIs AND ICANN
This Part analyzes two examples in order to understand the
effectiveness and limitations of private regulation of e-commerce. I
then show how cooperation between the government and the private
sector could improve this system. First, in Parts II.A and II.B, I
consider the case of privacy-rights regulation within commercial
transactions, one of the most important regulatory problems on the
Internet. 13 Furthermore, its importance is based on the need to foster
consumer trust of online commerce around the globe. 14 In this arena,
13. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 3-4 (June 1998),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2003). The
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") acknowledged this issue:
According to the results of a March 1998 Business Week survey, consumers not
currently using the Internet ranked concerns about the privacy of their personal
information and communications as the top reason they have stayed off the Internet.
Clearly, consumers care deeply about the privacy and security of their personal
information in the online environment and are looking for greater protections. These
findings suggest that consumers will continue to distrust online companies and will
remain wary of engaging in electronic commerce until meaningful and effective
consumer privacy protections are implemented in the online marketplace.
Id. (referencing Business Week/Harris Poll: Online Security, Bus. WK., Mar. 16, 1998, at 1027).
These findings are confirmed by other sources as well. Professor Schwartz noted the following:
Not surprisingly, Americans are highly concerned about who has access to their
personal information in cyberspace and the kinds of decisions that are made about
them with that information. A vigorous policy debate is now underway about the
merits of different mechanisms for establishing privacy standards on the Internet.
Despite the increasing involvement of government agencies and rising public concern,
no easy solution is in sight because information privacy raises some of the most
important and difficult regulatory issues for the Internet.
Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy
Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 743, 743-44.
14. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 13, at 3. As the FTC recognized:
Surveys have shown that increasing numbers of consumers are concerned about how
their personal information is used in the electronic marketplace.... [A] substantial
number of online consumers would rather forego information or products available
through the Web than provide a Web site personal information without knowing what
the site's information practices are.
Id. One of the main reasons consumers do not use the Internet is the concern about privacy of
their personal information. As Professor Benkler recognized:
With the rise of the Net, every move, whether part of a purchase or not, becomes a
potential point of information collection, for every move entails a series of information
exchanges between the source of the information and its user. All of these exchanges
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the debate over top-down versus bottom-up regulation has been strong,
and the emerging regulatory framework is one in which both
government and private firms prefer self-regulation. 15 On one hand,
private firms declare that they can regulate privacy rights effectively
without government interference. As an example, groups of these firms
have formed TPIs that offer to resolve disputes between consumers and
firms registered with such institutions. 16  Governments and consumer
groups view some of these private initiatives as indications that self-
regulation can be effective on the Internet. At the same time, they also
warn about some undesirable effects of a privately constructed
regulatory system, such as inadequate attention to consumer privacy
rights. 17
Second, in Part II.C, I analyze the dispute resolution system
implemented by ICANN. This institution has followed a policy of
trying to incorporate private and government factors into the regulation
of domain name disputes. As I show in Part I.C, ICANN continues to
suffer from significant drawbacks that must be improved if it is to
become an effective instrument of regulation. Finally, in Part II.D, I
compare the performance of privacy rights TPIs and ICANN's UDRP.
are in machine-readable form and they are all eminently capable of retransmission and
resale to other users of a consumer's personal profile.
The result is the possibility of an online life that is more or less completely subject
to surveillance by commercial companies.
Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1203,
1241 (2000).
15. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 13, at ii-iii (giving the U.S. government's point of
view about the preeminence of the self-regulation approach for the Internet); DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, LEADERSHIP FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM: DELIVERING ON DIGITAL PROGRESS AND
PROSPERITY, at v (2000) [hereinafter DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LEADERSHIP] (stating that the U.S.
government has attempted to increase digital technology across America), available at
http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/ec2000.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2003); BUREAU OF
CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: LOOKING AHEAD, at iv (Sept. 2000) (stating that the U.S.
government has attempted to increase digital technology across America), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/lookingahead/electronicmkpl.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2003).
16. See, e.g., BBBONLNE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS PROCEDURES, at
http://www.bbbonline.com/privacy/dr.pdf (effective Feb. 11, 1999) [hereinafter BBBONUNE,
DISPUTE PROCEDURES]; TRUSTE, TRUSTE WEB SITE PRIVACY SEAL PROGRAM WATCHDOG
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND APPEAL PROCESS, at http://www.truste.com/users/
compliancedoc.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter TRUSTE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROGRAM].
17. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 13, at i-ii (noting that "the Commission's goal has
been to encourage and facilitate effective self-regulation as the preferred approach to protecting
consumer privacy online"). In the same report, the Commission also mentions that "industry
association guidelines generally encourage members to provide notice of their information
practices and some choice with respect thereto, but fail to provide for access and security or for
enforcement mechanisms." Id. at ii.
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A. Bottom-up or Top-down Regulation?
The debate about the design of a regulatory system for online privacy
on the Internet has been based on the existence of two opposite
systems-a bottom-up or decentralized regime versus a top-down or
government-managed one. To evaluate the differences and possibilities
of both systems, I describe the advantages and disadvantages of each of
them.
1. Bottom-up Regulation
There are some clear advantages to a bottom-up system based on
private institutional management, such as a TPI. First, self-regulation
gives firms the correct incentives to define and develop their
technologies and investments.18 Avoiding rules about "how to do it"
and simply providing specific objectives, then leaving each firm to
decide how to carry them out, is better for the normal technological
evolution and investments in the private sector. In the case of
government intervention, firms are generally subject to excessive rules
imposed by regulators who do not always account for technological and
investment requirements of the particular industry. 19
Second, private firms know private sector needs better than the
government does and can design rules according to the possibilities of
the market. Self-generated rules can enhance investments and
technological development, instead of hurting these processes. 20 Third,
the costs of implementing such a private system are lower than those of
the traditional judicial system. As a result, cases can be resolved more
18. Robert E. Litan, Law and Policy in the Age of the Internet, 50 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1059-60
(2001). Litan provides an example:
The OnLine Privacy Alliance (OPA), a consortium of high-tech and "old economy"
companies, agreed on a set of voluntary guidelines in 1998. The guidelines urged
members to announce voluntarily their privacy policies-both on and off the Net-and
to offer consumers a choice to opt out of having their information forwarded to third
parties or used in any way other than that for which the data were originally
collected.... Finally, there are a number of well-known services-such as TRUSTe
and BBB OnLine-that will certify sites as having at least announced a privacy policy
on the Net and will audit whether they adhere to those policies.
Id.
19. Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 553, 578 (1999) ("In Cyberspace, technologies are constantly changing the
substance of a legal rule that may indeed affect technological development and vice versa.").
20. See Paul A. David, Understanding Digital Technology's Evolution and the Path of
Measured Productivity Growth: Present and Future in the Mirror of the Past, in
UNDERSTANDING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: DATA, TOOLS, AND RESEARCH 49 (Erik Brynjolfsson
& Brian Kahin eds., 2000) (providing an analysis on the evolution of technology on the Internet).
2003]
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quickly and at lower cost in these private institutions than in the
courts.
2 1
Finally, an important reason for preferring self-regulation is that
private firms are less concerned about disclosing information to a
private TPI than to a government agency or a court. Since the
government can use this information to pursue other cases against them,
firms may be unwilling to give this type of information to the
government and will be more comfortable with a private resolution
mechanism. As a result, a TPI can avoid some of the information
asymmetries by providing a more secure disclosure procedure than the
courts do.
2 2
There are also some important drawbacks to a TPI system. First,
unlike government regulatory agencies, private firms lack real capacity
to enforce rules.23  Private institutions also lack the ability to obligate
firms to participate in such a system. As a result, few firms
participate. 24 Different firms can create different regulatory institutions,
21. Professor Eric Posner takes a similar view in discussing the inherent limitations of
traditional courts and governmental regulation. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
15 (2000). Posner elaborates on these limitations:
The government is a clumsy tool. Police officers, prosecutors, judges, and juries
generally can obtain only a crude, third-hand account of events. Lawsuits are
expensive. If the court system cannot distinguish cooperation from defection with any
accuracy, and it is costly to use, people will not rely on it for ensuring cooperation.
Indeed, most people do not know much about the law, do not allow what they do know
about it to influence much in their relations with other people, and do not sue each
other when they have disputes.
Id.
22. Private information is better protected by a TPI than a government agency or court. See,
e.g., BBBONL1NE, DISPUTE PROCEDURES, supra note 16, at 3-4 (explaining how a TPI manages
a private firm's disclosed information).
23. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 13, at 16 (noting that "the absence of enforcement
mechanisms significantly weakens the effectiveness of industry-promulgated guidelines as a self-
regulatory tool").
24. Id. at ii-iii. The FTC report provides the following statistics:
The Commission's survey of over 1,400 Web sites reveals that industry's efforts to
encourage voluntary adoption of the most basic fair information practice principle-
notice-have fallen far short of what is needed to protect consumers. The
Commission's survey shows that the vast majority of Web sites-upward of 85%-
collect personal information from consumers. Few of the sites-only 14%... provide
any notice with respect to their information practices, and fewer still-approximately
2%--provide notice by means of a comprehensive privacy policy.... The
Commission's examination of industry guidelines and actual online practices reveals
that effective industry self-regulation with respect to the online collection, use, and
dissemination of personal information has not yet taken hold.
Id. In addition, according to new FTC surveys, "62% of commercial sites post privacy policies,
compared to 2% in 1998." DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LEADERSHIP, supra note 15, at 39. Yet the
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creating competition in the market for privacy regulation. This
competition can have two main effects. On the one hand, it offers
different kinds of protection for different needs. Individual consumer
choice is limited, however, since individuals cannot choose the TPI and
instead must accept the one offered by the specific website they enter.
On the other hand, competition can decrease the level of privacy-rights
protection, since firms could opt for those TPIs offering lower levels of
regulation. 25
Second, consumer groups are not participating actively in defining
this system. Their lack of participation could indicate a business-
friendly regulatory environment harmful to consumer concerns.26 This
issue also harms the system's legitimacy, as most participants in market
transactions are left without a voice. 27
Third, the jurisdiction of these private regulators is limited to the
same area as the government that supports them. In theory, private
regulators can solve any dispute on the Internet between, for example, a
consumer in the United States and a firm in Brazil. Yet there is no
power to obligate the foreign firm to accept the verdict, beyond
expulsion from the TPI's private seal program or bad publicity. As a
result, private regulators cannot overcome one of the government's
main problems in implementing regulations.
Fourth, when contracting for privacy, information asymmetries favor
firms over consumers on the Internet. Consumers are not completely
aware of the different uses firms have for private information on the
Internet. Furthermore, consumers may not know the many economic
outcomes that this kind of contract could contain. As a result, privacy
report also mentions that "[o]nly 20 percent of the surveyed sites had policies that satisfy all the
generally accepted fair information principles." Id.
25. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 767 ("[T]he existence of competing privacy seal programs
permits forum shopping by Websites that hope for weaker enforcement from one seal service
rather than the other.").
26. Benkler, supra note 14, at 1252. Benkler describes this concern:
Almost certainly, however, in the absence of regulation, the digitally networked
environment will be significantly more subject to surveillance than the analog
environment-because it can be, and because the constraints will only be placed to
reach a level just below the threshold of consumer rebellion, but no lower. Consumers
will therefore likely be exposed to information chosen by vendors who guess what a
user will want to see, based on past purchases reflected in a user profile.
Id.
27. Cf Edith Brown Weiss, The Robert L Levine Distinguished Lecture Series: The Rise or
the Fall of International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 368-70 (2000) (indicating a need for
common normative values in a community).
2003]
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contracts may be biased toward firms, the parties with greater
information.28
Finally, private firms have no incentives to provide good privacy
protection, since they can profit from lax rules. Consequently, the self-
regulatory framework will be biased toward industry participants. 29
This implies that the TPI could be easily taken over by some private
interests, and it could start constructing rules favoring those groups. 30
2. Top-down Regulation
Top-down government regulation also has its advantages and
disadvantages. Unlike private regulatory entities, the government can
obligate firms and consumers to fulfill the rules imposed. 31 In this case,
government has the power to overcome the collective action problem
and to coordinate different interests into a single system. 32
Second, it is easier for the government than it is for private firms to
coordinate regulatory norms on the Internet. The government has an
advantage relative to private agencies in cooperating globally.33 Most
28. See Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REv. 815, 822 (2000)
("[W]idespread information asymmetries exist regarding personal data processing and, as a result,
most visitors to Websites lack essential knowledge.").
29. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 768. Schwartz describes the extent of this bias:
Scholarship in behavioral economics has demonstrated that consumers' general inertia
towards default terms is a strong and pervasive limitation on free choice....
Specifically, in the current privacy market, this move will benefit the parties who
process and share our information and not those who help us place limits on this
processing. As a result of this current power dynamic, individuals faced with
standardized terms and expected to fend for themselves with privacy-property and
available technology are likely to accept whatever data processors offer them.
Id.
30. Schwartz, supra note 28, at 847 (noting that "most privacy self-regulation thus far has led
to online industry drafting weak standards that ratify the current status quo or even weaken it").
31. See Mike Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal
Information from Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457,
1501 (2001). Hatch displays an urgency for this kind of action: "There is an immediate need to
enact privacy laws governing the use of personal information such as bank and telephone
records.... Neither existing laws nor self-regulatory efforts are adequate to protect consumer
privacy in the information age. The lack of protection undermines an individual's right to privacy
and choice." Id. at 1501.
32. Schwartz, supra note 28, at 817 ("Indeed, the State, as part of its development of privacy
standards for the Internet, is not a force that invariably opposes the market or social norms, but is
capable of playing an important and positive role in helping to form both.").
33. See Weiss, supra note 27, at 368. Professor Weiss notes the difficulty of the government's
position as well:
International law will face an unusually heavy challenge in the decades ahead-to
provide the norms that connect the many parts of our global society. Political theory
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of the attempts to converge to a common set of rules on the Internet
have come from government initiatives.34 This is important given that
in many countries, such as European Union ("EU") member states,
there is no self-regulatory framework and the government imposes the
rules. Even under a bottom-up approach, the government's definition of
rights is a point of reference for the private sector. Private firms in
charge of regulation may base their rules and mechanisms on
governmental developments. As a result, the government is needed to
help define the system. 35
Finally, the government is the point at which all social demands for
regulation converge, where social consensus arises. Given this
characteristic, many groups not represented on the Internet, but affected
by it, can influence the government by communicating their
preferences. If the Internet is completely regulated by private firms that
also operate on it, the system will lack some components from other
social groups. Including the government in designing a regulatory
framework increases consumer participation and the resulting system's
legitimacy.
On the negative side, the government's enforcement power on the
Internet is weak.36 But private firms are even weaker in this respect.
Thus, the only chance of implementing an enforceable regulatory
framework is through cooperation between the government and the
tells us that viable communities need shared values, either globally or locally.
Communities need to feel that they are linked to each other.
Id.
34. See, e.g., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LEADERSHIP, supra note 15, at 39. The study notes the
interest and importance of the government in this process: "In December 1999, the Federal Trade
Commission ... and other U.S. agencies, working closely with industry and consumer advocates,
participated in the OECD's effort to produce guidelines for consumer protection online . !..." Id.
at 37. "The FTC has gained redress for thousands of consumers in 68 foreign countries." Id. at
39. "[T]he United States and the European Commission have completed the safe harbor privacy
accord, which helps to ensure that trans-Atlantic data flows will not be interrupted." Id. at 40.
35. Netanel, Self-Governance, supra note 8, at 476. Professor Netanel finds as follows:
Far from its promise of Pareto optimality, the proffered combination of self-regulation
and market forces would likely fail adequately to protect data privacy. Industry self
regulation, a group's regulation of its members' practices with the goal of reducing
harmful externalities to outsiders, is notoriously inadequate to its task.... [S]uch self-
regulation can only work under conditions of stringent government oversight.
Id.
36. See Denis T. Rice, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which Law and Forum Apply to Securities
Transactions on the Internet?, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 585, 595 (2000) ("The basic
principles of jurisdiction are essentially geographically-based. As a result, jurisdictional
principles are difficult to apply to the Internet, which is a largely boundless medium.").
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private sector.37 Second, the cost of operating a public court system is
more expensive than the private alternatives. This is in part because
most courts are based on real-life situations and are not appropriate for
the fast environment of the Internet. This could change, however, as the
government adapts to the new environment.
Third, information transferred from firms to the government in the
process of regulating online privacy can expose the firms to additional
liability. Finally, the government does not know the exact technological
capacities of the firms it is regulating. 38  As a result, very strict
regulations can hurt new technological developments and investment in
a rapidly changing environment.39
Both systems have important faults that make it almost impossible to
think of implementing a pure bottom-up or top-down regulatory
framework for privacy rights on the Internet. Instead, I suggest that
cooperation between the government and the private sector, exploiting
the advantages that each system offers, can help construct a better
regulatory system that overcomes some or all of the problems explained
above. Particularly in the United States, the government is inclined to
support private self-regulation instead of top-down regulation, but it is
timidly cooperating with those institutions that resolve claims regarding
privacy rights. A more active and well-defined role for the government
could enhance this regulatory framework and foster consumer
confidence in Internet commerce. Furthermore, it is important to
cooperate with other governments in order to converge to a unique set
37. See Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2041, 2061-62 (2000) (proposing government cooperation with the private sector for Internet
regulation); Schwartz, supra note 25, at 858 (mentioning the importance of self-regulation, but
also noting the need for state intervention on some issues).
38. See John C. Beck, Get a Grip! Regulating Cyberspace Won't Be Easy, 10 Bus. L. TODAY
14, 16 (2001). Beck outlines the three government arguments that self regulation is self
defeating:
First, they contend that by the time that deliberative and legislative bodies like the U.S.
Congress investigate, debate, vote and implement regulatory rules for a particular
technology, that technology has been superseded.
Second, they argue that efforts to reign in technology and its applications will only
squelch progress and force firms to take their innovations, jobs and revenues to less-
regulated shores.
Third, they predict that attempts to control or constrain burgeoning Net
technologies only prompt developers and users to seek out new applications and
network solutions even more difficult to regulate or trace back to a single source.
Id.
39. CLINTON & GORE, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that "government attempts to regulate are
likely to be outmoded by the time they are finally enacted, especially to the extent such
regulations are technology-specific").
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of rules for the Internet.40  I suggest that government cooperation with
TPIs can help define a better regulatory system for protecting privacy
rights on the Internet, since the government and the private sector can
complement each other and create a regulatory regime that results in
higher net social welfare than the current one.
B. Privacy Rights TPIs in Practice
TPIs can design privacy regulations and dispute resolution rules and
produce verdicts that are accepted by consumers as well as firms.
Nowadays, there are a number of these institutions. Some of the
most important ones are BBBOnLine, TRUSTe, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers' BetterWeb Program. 41 All of them have
constructed regulatory systems and are actually resolving consumer
complaints. 42 Their main goal is to generate a minimum set of rules
that will avoid government intervention.43 As my analysis shows,
40. Clinton and Gore found that "[in some areas, government agreements may prove
necessary to facilitate electronic commerce and protect consumers. In these cases, governments
should establish a predictable and simple legal environment based on a decentralized, contractual
model of law rather than one based on top-down regulation." Id. at 3-4. This government
support had declined as the FTC recently changed its point of view about government regulation.
As Litan notes, "[t]he poor compliance figures appear to have motivated the FTC in the summer
of 2000 to request that Congress provide the agency with the legal authority to issue rules
mandating a set of requirements relating to the collection and dissemination of personal
information acquired from users of the Net." Litan, supra note 18, at 1061.
41. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LEADERSHIP, supra note 15, at 36 ("The Administration sees the
BBB OnLine Reliability Program as a model for voluntary actions that can promote consumer
confidence in online transactions.").
42. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 13, at 10. According to the FTC:
To be effective, self-regulatory regimes should include both mechanisms to ensure
compliance (enforcement) and appropriate means of recourse by injured parties
(redress). Mechanisms to ensure compliance include making acceptance of and
compliance with a code of fair information practices a condition of membership in an
industry association; external audits to verify compliance; and certification of entities
that have adopted and comply with the code at issue.
Id. at 10.
43. BBBOnline states: "The mission of the Reliability seal program is to help web users find
reliable, trustworthy, businesses online, and to help reliable businesses identify themselves as
such, via voluntary self-regulatory programs. The BBBOnLine Reliability Seal supports the
growth and development of safe and secure e-commerce." BBBONLINE, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, at http://www.bbbonline.org/reliability/answer.asp# (last visited Sept. 28, 2003). A
few months earlier, BBBOnLine claimed, "Our mission is to help web users find reliable,
trustworthy business online, and to help reliable businesses identify themselves as such, all via
voluntary self-regulatory programs that help avoid government regulation of the Internet."
BBBONLINE, ABOUT THE RELIABILITY PROGRAM, at http://www.bbbonline.org/
reliability/index.asp (last visited July 18, 2003). The language about avoiding government
regulation of the Internet has now been removed.
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however, this is not true, since cooperation with the government can
actually enhance their regulatory systems.
1. Procedure and Enforcement
BBBOnLine has established a three-stage dispute resolution process.
In the first phase, the TPI analyzes the complaint and decides if it is
worth taking. Accepted complaints are sent to the Privacy Policy
Review Service ("PPRS"). In the second phase, the PPRS asks both
parties, the firm and the consumer, to reveal their cases and then renders
a verdict. If both parties accept the verdict, the case is closed. If one of
the parties objects to the verdict, the complaint proceeds to the Privacy
Review Appeals Board ("PRAB"). In this third phase, the PRAB
reviews the case and rules; its decision cannot be appealed.
Participating firms are subject to control of their privacy policies, and
they must adhere to BBBOnLine's verdicts. BBBOnLine's lack of
enforcement power is obvious given the fact that the last recourse
against any disobedience by participating firms is to refer the matter to
the government.44  Government agencies and the courts are the
enforcers of last resort that BBBOnLine can rely on to regulate the
participating firms, implying that BBBOnLine needs government
intervention to sustain its regulatory procedures.
TRUSTe states:
TRUSTe is an independent, non-profit privacy organization whose mission is to build
users' trust and confidence on the Internet and, in doing so, accelerate growth of the
Internet industry. Through extensive consumer and Web site research and the support
and guidance from many established companies and industry experts, TRUSTe has
earned a reputation as the leader in promoting privacy policy disclosure, informed user
consent, and consumer education.... The TRUSTe privacy program-based on a
branded online seal, the TRUSTe "trustmark"-bridges the gap between users'
concerns over privacy and Web sites' desire for self-regulated information disclosure
standards.
TRUSTE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.truste.com/about/truste/
about-faqs.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2003). Some time ago, TRUSTe claimed:
Our goal is to provide: [o]nline consumers with control over their personal
information; Web publishers with a standardized, cost-effective solution for both
satisfying the business model of their site and addressing consumers' anxiety over
sharing personal information online; [and] [g]overnment regulators with demonstrable
evidence that the industry can successfully self-regulate.
TRUSTE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM, supra note 16. Now the statement about
demonstrating to the government that the industry can self-regulate has been removed.
44. See Stephen R. Bergerson, E-commerce Privacy and the Black Hole of Cyberspace, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1527, 1545 (2001) ("Because of anti-trust constraints, industry cannot
discipline or punish those who do not abide by these voluntary codes or guidelines.
Consequently, industry is limited to using 'moral suasion' and implicit peer pressure to encourage
compliance and its effectiveness varies from industry to industry and over time.").
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TRUSTe also relies on the courts and government agencies in case
firms do not want to accept the solution proposed. TRUSTe states, "the
company must comply with TRUSTe's final determination or face
removal from the TRUSTe program, breach of contract legal
proceeding, and/or referral to the appropriate governing body." 45 It is
clear, then, that this so-called "private self-regulation" is not completely
as described, since its rules and procedures are defined according to pre-
existent or possible government rules and institutions.46 This is where
coordination between the government and institutions like BBBOnLine
is important, since both entities need each other in order for the system
to work.
2. Number of Firms Participating
Another aspect of the private system is the lack of firms participating
in the program. BBBOnLine has 9,491 firms on the Reliability Seal but
only 798 on the Privacy Seal;47 PricewaterhouseCoopers has just 27
associated firms; and TRUSTe has 1,576 member firms. These
numbers are far from spectacular, since most of the firms operating on
the Internet do not adhere to any of these programs. 48 Again, the only
45. TRUSTE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM, supra note 16.
46. See Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 16, at 565-67. Elkin-Koren illustrates this
point:
Proponents of private ordering for regulating access to information assume that the
state will provide the means for enforcing the privately generated norms. Post and
Johnson hold that "the prospect of governing the Internet via decentralized, emergent
decision-making does not imply that the use of force by the government would be
irrelevant, but only that it would be deployed in the service of rules made
predominantly by private actors."... The territorial governments are called to
function as enforcement agencies for rules that they, and their citizenry, had no say in
adopting and that may contradict the public interest.
Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace-Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1155, 1165 (1998) (citation omitted).
47. These numbers correspond to March 2001, but by June 2001 the number of firms under
the reliability program increased to more than 10,000, while the privacy program had more than
850 participants. Press Release, BBBOnline, Third Party Assurance Boosts Online Purchasing;
BBBOnline Privacy, Reliability Seals Increase Consumer Confidence; Privacy Remains Public's
Chief Concern (Oct. 17, 2001), available at www.bbbonline.org/about/press/2001/101701. asp
(last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
48. Bergerson, supra note 44, at 1543. Bergerson states:
[I]ndustry's self-regulatory momentum stalled. A year later, the FTC's 2000 survey
revealed that only 20% of Web sites had implemented the principles of notice, choice,
access and security. Only 41% of Websites posted "opt out" information.
While new self-regulatory "seal" programs... were noted as "significant
accomplishments," only "8% of heavily trafficked Websites display(ed) a seal from
one of them." Citing industry's failure to meet "the meaningful broad-based privacy
protections the Commission was seeking and that consumers want," the FTC
concluded that, "industry efforts alone have not been sufficient to properly protect
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institution with enough power to overcome this problem is the
government, which can require obligation in any system or provide an
alternative public system of conflict resolution. As long as the system is
merely voluntary for firms and the government does not take further
action, the majority of firms will refrain from engaging in some of these
procedures, given the lack of incentives to do so.
3. International Cooperation
This lack of enforcement is not limited to the capacity of TPIs to
enforce their rules, it is also related to the possibility of enforcing their
rules beyond the government's jurisdictional limits. BBBOnLine and
TRUSTe are incapable of offering their services to firms outside the
United States and Canada. This limitation arises from the fact that they
rely on the U.S. government as a last-resort enforcer of their rules.
Their expansion depends on the cooperation of the U.S. government
with other governments. Given the characteristics of these institutions,
cooperation is expected from the U.S. government. For example, the
agreement that the U.S. government reached with the EU in creating a
safe-harbor policy helps TPIs solve some of their jurisdictional
problems. 49  Given the EU's top-down system, it would be
unimaginable for a private institution to resolve such jurisdictional
issues without government intervention. 50
4. Consumer Participation
Consumers are not participating widely in the private regulatory
process. For example, BBBOnLine declares that a consumer
representative should be part of a panel that intervenes in appeals.5 1 A
BBBOnLine appellate panel consists of a representative of a member
company, an expert on World Wide Web designs and data management,
and finally, a consumer representative. But this says nothing about
privacy rights." The Report gave Congress the signal it needed to start privacy
legislation bandwagon.
Id. (citations ommitted).
49. See Marcia Howe Adams, Regulating the Net: Online Privacy and Advertising, 631
PRACTISING L. INST. PAT. COPYRIGHT TRADEMARK & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 1031, 1034-39 (2001) (providing a description of U.S. and EU legislation and safe harbor
principles).
50. See BBBONLINE, BBBONLINE JAPANESE PRIVACY SEAL, at
http://www.bbbonline.com/Privacy/jipdec.asp (last visited July 18, 2003) (providing an example
of international cooperation between TPIs and an agreement implemented by BBBOnLine and a
Japanese TPI).
51. BBBONLINE, DISPUTE PROCEDURES, supra note 16, at 13.
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which consumer institutions or groups will participate in the process.52
This omission permits firms to choose a consumer representative they
like.
Accordingly, the government should step in as a last resource in those
cases in which the parties do not accept the TPI's decision, increasing
the cost of defecting from the regulatory system and promoting firm
participation without resorting to higher costs of control. Second, the
government should also oversee the TPI institution to prevent agency
capture by economic interests of private firms that harms consumer
interests. Government oversight can ensure that a TPI's policies
address both consumers' and firms' concerns. Government
involvement will also help to coordinate similar actions with other
governments that, in turn, can help create a converging system for
privacy protection on the Internet.
From my previous analysis, it is easy to see that the actual
functioning of private TPIs is not optimal. There are many problems
with the implementation of such a self-regulatory system that make for
a weak regulatory framework for privacy rights in Internet markets.
Government intervention can improve this regulatory system by
cooperating in the design and enforcement of the substantive rules.
This intervention, given that it is moderated by the existence of private
institutions such as TPIs, could actually foster consumer confidence and
improve market functioning on the Internet.
In his commentary, when Professor Froomkin offers his lucid
description of how firms choose a private regulator, mentioning costs C
and C* and N identical firms,53 I am not certain if he is explaining my
thinking or arguing against it. If it is the second, then I am concerned. I
agree that private firms will offer the minimum amount of privacy
protection in order to make consumers indifferent between engaging in
a market transaction or not doing so (Professor Froomkin's third
alternative). In this circumstance, the government can collaborate with
the private sector by elevating the level and number of privacy rights.
However, I warn off against excessive government regulation that could
harm private investment and create incentives for private firms to defect
by trying to avoid government regulation through the use of their
superior technological knowledge. This is the essence of the private-
public cooperation that this Article leads to. In short, we appear to be
saying the same thing, but I hope to offer a better solution by enhancing
52. See id.
53. Froomkin, Commentary, supra note 10, at 146-47.
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government participation without creating incentives for the private
sector to defect.
C. Performance of the ICANN Dispute Resolution System
ICANN manages IP address space allocation, protocol parameter
assignment, domain name system, and root server system functions on
the Internet.54  It is a non-profit organization supported by many
governments, but primarily the U.S. government promoted its creation
in 1998. 55 Among its different activities, the management of the
domain-name system has proved to be a delicate area in which property
and trademark rights from the real world collide with the unregulated
nature of the Internet.56 When local courts could not adequately handle
domain-name disputes, 57 a need for an arbitration mechanism arose.
58
54. INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, ABOUT ICANN, at
http://www.icann.org/general/abouticann.htm (last modified Sept. 18, 2003) [hereinafter ICANN,
ABOUT ICANN]. See generally Edward C. Anderson & Timothy S. Cole, The UDRP-A Model
for Dispute Resolution in E-Commerce?, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 235 (2002)
(discussing the history and development of the UDRP); A. Michael Froomkin,
Habermas@discourse.net: Toward A Critical Theory Of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749
(2003) (discussing the history and development of ICANN); Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 8
(discussing the history and development of ICANN).
55. ICANN, ABOUT ICANN, supra note 50.
Prior to the formation of ICANN, administration of the authoritative list ultimately
linking particular names and numbers (Internet Protocol (IP) addresses) to specific
computers was the responsibility of various departments of the U.S. government and,
later, Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), a for profit corporation operating under contract
with the U.S. Department of Commerce.... Objections to the monopoly over
registration services held by NSI (and the U.S. government) led in 1998 to the creation
of ICANN and in particular ICANN's capacity to authorize multiple registrars to
compete over registration services.
Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from ICANN, 6 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 257, 259-60 (2002).
Many critics have said that ICANN received important power from the U.S. government, which
should be reserved for the government instead of a private institution. See, e.g., Froomkin,
Wrong Turn, supra note 8, at 132-33, 141-43 (claiming that the creation of ICANN is
inconsistent with both the Constitution and the Administrative Procedures Act). However, this is
a highly debatable topic, as evidenced by Edward Brunet, Defending Commerce's Contract
Delegation of Power to ICANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (2002).
56. See infra Parts III-IV (describing the problems of Internet regulation).
57. See Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275
(2002) (analyzing the problems courts have in dealing with Internet-related issues); infra Parts
III-IV (analyzing the problems local laws and courts face with the Internet).
58. See Laurence R. Heifer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The
Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141,
155-56 (2001).
Reconciling the competing interests of trademark owners and domain name registrants
has not proved an easy task, either nationally or internationally. The territorial nature
of trademark rights, the lack of a single body of rules governing trademark-domain
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Many private actors with interests in the creation of such a system and
with influence over ICANN policymaking, together with other public
organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"), promoted the creation of a dispute resolution mechanism for
domain-name disputes. 59 Consequently, in 1999, ICANN created the
UDRP.6 0 Under this policy, ICANN authorized a number of private
TPIs to evaluate disputes between Internet users regarding domain-
name rights.61 ICANN then designed a series of dispute resolution
procedures, leaving TPIs to add their own complementary rules.62
ICANN and its UDRP have received mixed reviews. 63 Professor
name disputes, the difficulty of locating registrants, and the possibility that different
domain name registrants own multiple iterations of a preexisting mark all make the
prospect of litigating before national courts protracted, expensive and perhaps even
futile. Not surprisingly, trademark owners have expressed interest in streamlined and
inexpensive non-national dispute settlement alternatives, particularly for disputes with
a class of domain name registrants known as cybersquatters.
Id.
59. WIPO produced a report for ICANN detailing the necessity of creating a dispute
resolution system and proposing the specific characteristics of such a system. See ICANN,
TIMELINE FOR THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNIFORM DOMAIN-NAME
DISPUTE-RESOLUTION POLICY, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last updated
Feb. 5, 2002) [hereinafter ICANN, TIMELINE] (describing the timetable of creation of the UDRP
with links to the WIPO initiative); see also Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 58, at 171-79
(describing the proposal of WIPO and the reforms introduced by ICANN when implementing the
system).
60. See Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 58, at 178-79 (describing the creation of the UDRP);
see also ICANN, TIMELINE, supra note 59 (giving a chronology of UDRP's implementation).
61. The approved providers are: WIPO, as of December 1, 1999; The National Arbitration
Forum ("NAF'), as of December 23, 1999; eResolutions ("eRes"), as of January 1, 2000 (but
terminated effective November 30, 2001); CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution ("CPR"), as of
May 22, 2000; and Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre ("ADNDRC"), as of
February 28, 2002. ICANN, APPROVED PROVIDERS FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN-NAME DISPUTE-
RESOLUTION POLICY, at http://www.icann.orgldndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm (last updated
Mar. 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICANN, APPROVED PROVIDERS].
62. The two main instruments that regulate the system are the UDRP and the Rules for the
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy. See ICANN, UNIFORM DOMAIN-NAME
DISPUTE-RESOLUTION POLICY, GENERAL INFORMATION, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/ (last
updated Feb. 5, 2002) [hereinafter ICANN, UDRP GENERAL INFORMATION] (introducing the
UDRP as well as the Rules for the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy and
providing links to each). Both documents were approved on October 24, 1999. ICANN,
TIMELINE, supra note 59. Each provider can produce its own rules in those areas not regulated by
the policy. ICANN, RULES FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN-NAME DISPUTE-RESOLUTION POLICY, at
http://www.icann.orgldndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (Oct. 24, 1999) [hereinafter ICANN, RULES
FOR UDRP].
63. There is a wide range of criticism and some support of the UDRP by ICANN. For
criticism, see MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING
OF CYBERSPACE (2002) [hereinafter MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT]; MILTON MUELLER,
SUCCESS BY DEFAULT: A NEW PROFILE OF DOMAIN NAME TRADEMARK DISPUTES UNDER
ICANN'S UDRP (Syracuse Univ. Sch. of Info. Studies, Working Paper, 2002), available at
http://dcc.syr.edulmarkle/markle-report-final.pdf; Wayde Brooks, Wrestling over the World Wide
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Web: ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for Domain Name Disputes, 22 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 297 (2001); A. Michael Froomkin, Form and Substance in Cyberspace, 6 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 93 (2002) [hereinafter Froomkin, Form and Substance]; A. Michael
Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy"-Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 605 (2002) [hereinafter Froomkin, ICANN'S "UDRP"]; Froomkin, Wrong Turn,
supra note 8; Kathleen E. Fuller, ICANN: The Debate over Governing the Internet, 2001
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0002, at http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/
200lldltr0002.html; Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 903 (2002); Adam Goldstein,
ICANNSUCKS.B1Z (And Why You Can't Say That): How Fair Use of Trademarks in Domain
Names is Being Restrained, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1151 (2002);
Hadfield, supra note 55; Heifer & Dinwoodie, supra note 58; Holger P. Hestermeyer, The
Invalidity of ICANN's UDRP Under National Law, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2002); Stacy
H. King, The "Law That It Deems Applicable ": ICANN Dispute Resolution, and the Problem of
Cybersquatting, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453 (2000); Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars:
Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 149
(2000); Pamela Segal, Attempts to Solve the UDRP's Trademark Holder Bias: A Problem That
Remains Unsolved Despite the Introduction of New Top Level Domain Names, 3 CARDOZO
ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2001), at http://www.cardozojcr.com/vol3no1/
notes02.html; Richard E. Speidel, ICANN Domain Name Dispute Resolution, The Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Limitations of Modern Arbitration Law, 6 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 167 (2002); Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Fast, Cheap and Out of Control:
Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution Process, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 191
(2002); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (October
2000); Neil Batavia, Comment, That Which We Call a Domain by Any Other Name Would Smell
as Sweet: The Overbroad Protection of Trademark Law as It Applies to Domain Names on the
Internet, 53 S.C. L. REV. 461 (2002); Keith Blackman, Note, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy: A Cheaper Way to Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics, 15 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 211 (2001); Scott Hejny, Comment, Opening the Door to Controversy: How Recent
ICANN Decisions Have Muddied the Waters of Domain Name Dispute Resolution, 38 Hous. L.
REv. 1037 (2001).
For articles that are generally supportive of the UDRP, see Brunet, supra note 55; Patrick D.
Kelley, Emerging Patterns in Arbitration Under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 181 (2002); Joe Sims & Cynthia L. Bauerly, A Reply to
Professor Froomkin's Form and Substance in Cyberspace, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 125
(Spring 2002) [hereinafter Sims & Bauerly, A Reply]; Joe Sims & Cynthia L. Bauerly, A
Response to Professor Froomkin: Why ICANN Does Not Violate The APA or The Constitution, 6
J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 65 (2002) [hereinafter Sims & Bauerly, A Response]; Stephen J.
Ware, Domain Name Arbitration in the Arbitration-Law Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the
UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 129 (2002); Leah Phillips Falzone, Comment, Playing
The Hollywood Name Game in Cybercourt: The Battle over Domain Names in the Age of
Celebrity-Squatting, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 289 (2001); Christopher P. Rains, Comment, A
Domain by Any Other Name: Forging International Solutions for the Governance of Internet
Domain Names, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 355 (2000); Lisa M. Sharrock, Note, The Future of
Domain Name Dispute Resolution: Crafting Practical International Legal Solutions from Within
the UDRP Framework, 51 DUKE L.J. 817 (2001).
For articles that outline the UDRP decision-making process generally, see Olivia Maria Baratta
& Dana L. Hanaman, A Global Update on the Domain Name System and the Law: Alternative
Dispute Resolution for Increasing Internet Competition-Oh, the Times They Are A-Changin'!, 8
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325 (2000); David H. Bernstein, The Alphabet Soup of Domain Name
Dispute Resolution: The UDRP and ACPA, 716 PRACTICING L. INST. PAT. COPYRIGHT
TRADEMARK & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 251 (2002); Jeffrey J. Look, Law
and Order on the Wild, Wild West (WWW), 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 817 (2002); David
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Froomkin, one of the most thoughtful critics of ICANN and one of the
founding editors of http://www.icannwatch.org, persuasively
demonstrates that the Department of Commerce's actions in forming
ICANN and granting it broad authority to govern Internet addresses
violated the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") and also possibly
ran afoul of the constitutional non-delegation doctrine.64 Professor
Froomkin finds a system in which ICANN simply regulates domain
names in a manner that favors trademark owners and ICANN insiders,
without any concerns for fundamental due process considerations. 65
Along similar lines, Milton Mueller, one of the foremost scholars of the
domain name system and ICANN, urges that the U.S. government
abdicated its responsibility to define the scope of the rights and assets
that were transferred to ICANN. According to Mueller, ICANN lacks
the accountability and representation of a private sector organization but
possesses the monopoly power and legislative authority of a
governmental entity. 66
ICANN's specific UDRP policies do not fare much better. Elizabeth
Thornburg finds that the UDRP is fundamentally flawed and unfair and
highlights the need for government intervention to improve its
functioning.67 Michael Geist provides persuasive evidence that forum
shopping is a key aspect of the UDRP and that the whole system is
biased toward trademark holders. 68
1. Procedure and Enforcement
The general procedure for considering complaints is competitive and
one in which different organizations can offer dispute resolution
services to users.69 This is different from TPIs, in which consumers are
subject to the private provider imposed by the website visited, and
different providers create different rules. In the UDRP system, Internet
users can choose the provider knowing that the underlying set of rules is
E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute Decisions, 18 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35 (2001).
64. Froomkin, Form and Substance, supra note 63, at 118-19; Froomkin, ICANN's "UDRP,"
supra note 63; Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 8, at 132-33, 143-53; Sims & Bauerly, A
Reply, supra note 63, at 126-27; Sims & Bauerly, A Response, supra note 63, at 90-91.
65. Froomkin, Form and Substance, supra note 63, at 118-19; Sims & Bauerly, A Reply,
supra note 63, at 126-27.
66. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT, supra note 63, at 217-22; Milton Mueller, ICANN and
Internet Governance: Sorting Through the Debris of 'Self-Regulation,' I INFO 497, 518-19
(1999), available at http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/muell.pdf (last visited July 14, 2003).
67. Thomburg, supra note 63, at 207, 228-32.
68. Geist, supra note 63, at 936.
69. See ICANN, APPROVED PROVIDERS, supra note 61.
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uniform and consistent. ICANN provides a set of rules that delimits the
issues to be regulated, the cases that providers should evaluate, panel
composition, and penalties. 70 Yet, it permits providers freedom to
implement further rules and to charge the corresponding fees. 71
Thus, users face a common set of rules, but complainants can choose
the provider they prefer. This framework has provided good
competitive incentives for domain-name dispute-resolution service
providers. 72 Nonetheless, it has also generated problems of bias in
favor of complainants because they choose the provider. 73 Therefore, in
the current system, complainants have an incentive to choose the
provider who is friendlier to complainants, and the providers' optimal
strategy is to favor complainants to ensure that they continue to be
chosen in the future. 74
70. ICANN, UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY, at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (Oct. 24, 1999) [hereinafter ICANN, UDRP] (listing
the policy rules). For an analysis of the policy, see Froomkin, ICANN'S "UDRP," supra note 63.
71. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting the ability of TPIs to formulate rules
beyond those created by ICANN).
72. Anderson & Cole, supra note 54, at 249.
Considering that the filing fee for a dispute involving a single domain name, heard by a
single panelist, can be as low as $1,150[,] [t]he UDRP is an attractive alternative to
protracted litigation. While there are several factors that contribute to the low cost of a
UDRP proceeding, the primary reason is the simplicity of the process. The
administrative panel is limited to considering the written submissions made by the
parties. The UDRP does not provide for discovery or submission of interrogatories by
the parties, elements that typically increase the cost of other processes, in both time and
money.
Id.
73. Geist, supra note 63, at 936.
This study provides compelling evidence that forum shopping has become an integral
part of the UDRP and that the system may indeed be biased in favor of trademark
holders. Both WIPO and NAF, the two dominant ICANN-accredited arbitration
providers, feature case allocation that suggests that the panelist selection process is not
random. Rather, it appears to be heavily biased toward ensuring that a majority of
cases are steered toward complainant friendly panelists. Moreover, the data shows that
there is a correlation between the provider panelist selection and case outcome. When
providers control who decides a case, as they do for all single panel cases,
complainants win just over 83% of the time. As provider influence over panelists
diminishes, as occurs in three-member panel cases, the complainant winning
percentage drops to 60%.
Id.
74. It is interesting to notice that the only provider that declared bankruptcy was e-Resolution,
which was an entity in which more cases were won by respondents. See UDRPINFO.COM,
ERESOLUTION (ERES), at http://www.udrpinfo.com/prov.php#eres (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).
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Only domain-name disputes are evaluated under this system.75 The
complainant can file a complaint with any of the approved providers
that ICANN has authorized. Once the complaint is received by the
provider, it has to evaluate its validity. If the complaint is invalid, then
the provider can ask for further information or discard it. Once the
respondent has submitted an answer to a valid complaint, or the legal
time period for a response has expired, the provider forms a panel of
either one or three members, depending on the parties' requests. 76
However, in contrast to TPIs from the previous section, here the
panelists are elected from a list created by the provider and in agreement
with the parties. As a result, even though the complainant can elect the
provider, the respondent participates in panel selection. Thus, the panel
is more transparent than in a TPI, where panelists are appointed directly
by a TPI without the aggrieved consumer's intervention. 77
Once the panel is constituted, it must decide the case and has the
power to ask for additional information from any of the parties. If the
parties reach a private agreement, the panel terminates its process
without any further decision. If the parties initiate a court trial, the
panel can continue with its deliberations or decide to terminate the
case. 78 As in the case of the privacy rights TPIs, the providers do not
have jurisdiction over matters initiated in court, which is one of the
main limitations of these types of dispute resolution regimes. That said,
most UDRP cases have not been contested in court, and the parties have
accepted the panel decisions. 79
From a regulatory perspective, one of the UDRP's main advantages
relative to the TPI regime is that ICANN is able to enforce panel
decisions. The only action that the panel can enforce is the termination
or transfer of the domain name in dispute, which is, of course, under
75. ICANN, UDRP, supra note 70, para. 5.
All other disputes between you and any party other than us regarding your domain
name registration that are not brought pursuant to the mandatory administrative
proceeding provisions of Paragraph 4 shall be resolved between you and such other
party through any court, arbitration or other proceeding that may be available.
Id.
76. ICANN, RULES FOR UDRP, supra note 62, para 6.
77. See supra Part II.B.4 (noting that firms, and not consumers, select consumer
representatives on appellate panels).
78. ICANN, UDRP, supra note 70, para. 4k.
79. According to UDRPLaw.net, just seventy-three UDRP cases went to court through July
2002. This is a small number as compared with the more than 4,000 cases UDRP providers had
considered since 1999. See UDRPLAw.NET, THE UDRP-COURT CHALLENGE DATABASE, at
http://www.udrplaw.netfUDRPappeals.htm (last updated Mar. 27, 2003); UDRPINFO.cOM, at
http://www.udrpinfo.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
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ICANN's management. 80 ICANN's enforcement ability arises from
both its design as a regulatory agency and the design of the subject
matter it regulates. ICANN is supported by the U.S. government and
accepted by other countries as the organization which manages domain
names. The root system that ICANN regulates favors an uncompetitive
market for root names. 81 The legitimacy of its functions is the basis for
effectively enforcing domain-name dispute-resolution rules. 82 This
characteristic makes the UDRP one of the most viable systems for
dispute resolution on the Internet.
Nonetheless, to maintain its legitimacy among countries and different
Internet users, ICANN has to develop new ways to include the
Internet's many constituencies in its decision-making process. If we
look at how ICANN is formed, we can see that some constituencies on
the Internet have a high degree of control over its policymaking process,
while other groups-mainly users but also the private sector-have a
low level of participation. The success of the UDRP, and ICANN itself,
will depend on the political pressure exerted over ICANN to involve
new participants and to develop new ways of letting wide-ranging
interest groups influence its decision-making. 83
2. Number of Firms Participating
Under the UDRP system, every person or entity that registers a new
domain name is subject to ICANN's policies, since the companies that
manage domain-name assignments on the Internet are subject to
ICANN authorization. 84 As a result, most of the domain-name owners
80. Again, the characteristic of the root system for the Internet, which is managed and
monopolized by ICANN, generates a disincentive to other providers to offer other root of domain
names. As a result, the actual design of the system provides ICANN with a well-defined power
of enforcement for the UDRP. See MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT, supra note 63, at 215-17
(describing the lack of competition, ICANN's monopoly, and the incentives of the organization
participants to maintain the system as it is).
81. Id.
82. The legitimacy of ICANN action has been under strong debate lately. See Heifer &
Dinwoodie, supra note 58, at 244-45 (discussing how the problems of the UDRP undermine the
legitimacy on which it is based).
83. See infra Part 1HI (discussing the political process of ICANN).
84. ICANN, UDRP, supra note 70, para. 1. The UDRP's purpose statement reads:
1. Purpose. This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") has
been adopted by [ICANN], is incorporated by reference into your Registration
Agreement, and sets forth the terms and conditions in connection with a dispute
between you and any party other than us (the registrar) over the registration and use of
an Internet domain name registered by you. Proceedings under.., this Policy will be
conducted according to the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (the "Rules of Procedure"), which are available at www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-
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are subject to the UDRP.85 From a regulatory perspective, this provides
the system with wide coverage and uniform regulation throughout most
of the Internet. This feature is another important difference with respect
to privacy rights TPIs, since adoption of their regulatory regime is
voluntary. The specific design of ICANN as the only institution that
manages domain names, and the support from different governments,
generates a quasi-automatic jurisdiction for those who request a new
domain name.
3. International Cooperation
In the case of the UDRP, the nature of the issue regulated permits
enhanced enforcement of the rules. However, international cooperation
is necessary to sustain the policy in place throughout the Internet.
86
Since ICANN relied on the U.S. government's support, other developed
countries have followed, and most countries now accept its
jurisdiction. 87 There are some characteristics of the ICANN structure
that help explain this success in reaching international consensus. First,
the management structure of ICANN has become more open to
participation and, especially after last year's reforms, the international
community has more say on ICANN policymaking. 88  Different
constituencies from all around the globe can participate in the decision-
making and shaping of ICANN policies. 89 Given the interest in ICANN
becoming an international body with jurisdiction over the Internet, it is
not surprising that there have been major changes in the way Board
members are elected and in the participation of country code top-level
rules-24oct99.htm, and the selected administrative-dispute-resolution service
provider's supplemental rules.
Id.
85. This characteristic depends on the concentrated structure of the root system and the lack of
competition. See MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT, supra note 63, at 186-89, 216.
86. The need for international cooperation is explained by the participation of country code
registries ("ccTLDs") as one of the most active ICANN constituencies. Furthermore, it is through
these international actors that ICANN can cooperate in the development of rules that apply
throughout the Internet. Recently, ccTLDs registries have upgraded their participation and voice
in the ICANN policymaking process. See infra Part III (discussing the political evolution and
structure of ICANN).
87. See INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY ("IANA"), ROOT-ZONE WHOIS
INFORMATION, at http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm (last updated Nov. 26, 2001) (listing
all countries that participate in ICANN).
88. See infra Part IM (discussing the historical and political evolution of ICANN).
89. See ICANN, BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND
NUMBERS art. I, § 2, para. 4, at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-
15decO2.htm (Dec. 15, 2002) [hereinafter ICANN, DECEMBER 2002 BYLAWS] (listing
participation of diverse constituents as a core value).
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domains ("ccTLDs") registries.90 These changes will permit more
cooperation at the international level, which will allow for better
enforcement of dispute resolution policies.91
Nonetheless, the inclusion of international actors will also increase
the need for reform in the UDRP to accommodate different
perspectives. For example, the Internet's growth in Asia and ICANN's
interest in being the main source of domain-name control and regulation
have prompted the creation of two new offices to resolve disputes in
that region.92 As a result, the UDRP could accommodate different
views and be open to changes, even though groups with more power
inside ICANN will resist such reforms.93 Second, one purpose of
90. See id. art. VI, § 1 (providing a complete version of ICANN's new bylaws). Until
December 15, 2002, the Board of Directors of the ICANN consisted of nineteen members. Five
of them came from the original Board of Directors established in 1998 and the other fourteen
came from the following organizations: (a) five from At-Large membership, each of these five
representing a different geographic area (Africa, Asia-Australia-Pacific, Europe, Latin America
and the Caribbean and North America); (b) three from the Domain-Name Supporting
Organization ("DNSO"), which consisted of different constituency groups, including Business,
Non-Commercial, ccTLD Registries, gTLD Registries, ISPs, Registrars, and Intellectual Property
interests; (c) three from the Address Supporting Organization ("ASO"), which consisted of the
Asian Pacific Network Information Center ("APNIC"), American Registry for Internet Numbers
("ARIN"), Latin American and Caribbean Internet Address Registry ("LACNIC"), and Rdseaux
IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre ("RIPE NCC"); and finally, (d) three from the
Protocol Supporting Organization ("PSO"), which consisted of the Internet Engineering Task
Force ("IETF"), the World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C"), the International
Telecommunication Union ("ITU"), and the European Telecommunications Standard Institute
("ETSI"). See ICANN, BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND
NUMBERS art. V, § 4, at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-12febO2.htm (Feb.
12, 2002); see also infra fig. 2.
Under the new ICANN bylaws, beginning December 15, 2002, the Board of Directors should
consist of fifteen members elected as follows: eight from the Nominating Committee, two from
ASO, two from Country Code Names Supporting Organization ("ccNSO"), two by Generic Name
Supporting Organization ("GNSO"), and one is the President of ICANN. ICANN, DECEMBER
2002 BYLAWS, supra note 89, art. VI. The Nominating Committee is composed as follows: five
members from At-Large Representation, two from Business Constituency of GNSO, one from
gTLD Registries, one from gTLD Registrars, one from Council ccNSO, one from ISP
Constituency of GNSO, one from Intellectual Property Constituency of GNSO, one from ASO,
one designated by the ICANN Board to represent academic and other similar institutions, one
from Consumer and Civil Society Groups from the non-commercial constituency of GNSO, one
from IETF, and one from ICANN Technical Liaison Group. Id. art. VII, § 2.
91. See ICANN, CCTLD RESOURCE MATERIALS, at http://www.icann.org/cctlds/ (last
updated June 3, 2003) (describing the objectives and activities of ccTLDs in ICANN).
92. See CHINA INT'L ECON. & TRADE ARBITRATION COMM'N & H.K. INT'L ARBITRATION
CTR., ASIAN DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTRE, at
http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/index.html (Feb. 28, 2002) (stating that the Asian Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Center "was formed to provide dispute resolution services in regard to
disputed generic top level domain names").
93. See infra Part Ill (analyzing how stakeholders of ICANN can resist major reforms in
policymaking and retain power).
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ICANN's board was to permit the participation of people from different
countries and provide them a voice in the political process.9 4  But
ICANN's governance has been relegated to groups and constituencies
that were introduced as initial parts of the organization.95 As ICANN
tries to move to a more international environment, these constituencies
should accommodate interests mainly from other countries-the private
sector, Internet users, and the government.
In this sense, ICANN is an institution in its formative stage, in which
different constituencies and groups try to establish positions in the
management of the institution. 96 The forces that shape the political
characteristics of ICANN will also shape the rules of its dispute-
resolution policy. In the end, if ICANN succeeds in promoting and
enforcing a set of dispute resolution rules for domain names throughout
the Internet, it will be due to the capacity of its constituencies to
accommodate different demands and to the political process inside the
corporation that enables such a process to occur.
4. User Participation
User participation is much higher in the UDRP than in the previous
case study of the privacy rights TPIs. 97 First, every user that registers a
domain name on the ICANN-managed root server is automatically
under the jurisdiction of the providers and is subject to the rules of the
UDRP.98 Second, ICANN has provided, in theory, numerous ways by
which users can contact the organization and propose reforms to the
dispute resolution system. 99 Furthermore, users participate directly in
94. See ICANN, BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND
NUMBERS BACKGROUND, at http://www.icann.orglgeneral/support-orgs.htm (last updated Dec.
16, 2002).
The ICANN Bylaws provide for three Supporting Organizations (SOs) to assist,
review, and develop recommendations on Internet policy and structure within three
specialized areas. (See Bylaws, Articles VIII, IX, and X.) The SOs help to promote
the development of Internet policy and encourage diverse and international
participation in the technical management of the Internet. Each SO names three
Directors to the ICANN Board.
Id.
95. See infra Part III (discussing the historical and political evolution of ICANN).
96. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (overviewing changes in ICANN's board of
directors to provide for more diverse participation in ICANN's affairs).
97. Since 1999, UDRP providers have considered more than 4,000 cases. See supra note 79.
98. ICANN, UDRP GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 62 (stating that "[a]ll registrars in
the .aero, .biz, .com, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, .net, and org top-level domains follow the
[UDRP]").
99. ICANN, THE ICANN HOMEPAGE, at http://www.icann.org (last updated Oct. 22, 2003)
(describing multiple instruments users have to reach ICANN and participate).
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the Board of Directors through the election of representatives in the At-
Large Group and in the Generic Name Supporting Organization
("GNSO") under the constituency of non-commercial users. 100
However, user participation in ICANN policymaking has been scarce,
and the commercial private sector is the main power that controls
ICANN. As a result, although ICANN fares better than the privacy
rights TPIs, it is still biased toward private firms' interests regarding
domain-name policies.
Many thoughtful critics, such as Professors Froomkin and Mueller,
point to the lack of democratic participation in ICANN's decision-
making.10' For example, ICANN has strictly controlled the number of
top-level domain names, which has created an artificial scarcity in the
market. 10 2 This scarcity favors specific private firms with interests in
controlling the resource. 10 3 By letting private firms compete to provide
options in the top-level domain name arena, ICANN could improve
users' welfare by providing more consumer choice. However,
competition at this level will decrease the value of the top-level domain
names that already exist today, hurting the profits of the firms that
control them. As these firms have significant influence over ICANN's
decisions, it is to be expected that they will exert pressure to avoid such
competition. Nonetheless, if ICANN wants to promote cooperation and
continue to advance in its governance of the domain name system, it
should accommodate users' demands.
One of the most common criticisms of the UDRP is that the domain-
name rules enforced by providers are designed to protect trademark
holders' interests on the Internet, at the expense of free speech interests.
For example, if someone registers a domain name called
"FIFAWorldCup.com," devoted to criticizing the way the Fdd6ration
Internationale de Football Association ("FIFA") has designed the
classification groups for the 2006 World Cup in Germany, FIFA could
claim that this domain name infringes on its own trademark rights and
seek to cancel this registration by initiating a complaint with a UDRP
100. See ICANN, ICANN AT-LARGE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, at http://www.icann.org/
committees/alac/ (last updated June 26, 2003) (describing the tasks and composition of the At-
Large Group); see also ICANN, GENERIC NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS, at
http://gnso.icann.org/ (last updated Sept. 25, 2003) (describing and detailing the different
constituencies that make up the GNSO).
101. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (summarizing Mueller and Froomkin's
criticisms).
102. See MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT, supra note 63, at 219 (describing how ICANN
regulates the supply of top-level domain names, and the price, performance, and market structure
of the domain-name industry).
103. Id.
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provider. These kinds of problems have arisen because of the small
number of top-level domain names and the broad definitions employed
to determine the type of content that is admissible under each top-level
domain name. ICANN could create a new top-level domain name for
free speech, such as .fsp, in which all domain-name registrants have to
be individuals or non-commercial entities. All names, including
trademarks, could be used in this new top-level domain name, so long
as no one engaged in commercial activities in the space. In this way,
many of the free speech concerns can be accommodated. ICANN can
then have a commercial set of top-level domain names in which
trademarks are the rule for name assignment and also a free speech
section in which users can express themselves without fear that their
domain names and free speech rights will be suppressed.
With respect to the UDRP itself, there are more Internet users
employing these dispute procedures, as compared to the privacy rights
TPIs. First, both parties have the opportunity to take part in panel
formation, guaranteeing a higher degree of impartiality and
independence than in the case of panels formed directly by TPIs with
interests dominated by private businesses. 10 4 Nonetheless, it is clear
that the ICANN system is far from independent, given its bias toward
private firms, although this bias is less than that of the totally private
privacy rights TPIs. Second, given that the general governing rules
employed by the UDRP providers are supplied by ICANN, and users do
have the opportunity to place representatives on ICANN's Board of
Directors, these rules will be subject to review to insure fairer treatment
of non-commercial parties. Third, international users have a larger
voice in the rules and management of ICANN than they do in privacy
rights TPIs, given the attempts to construct a more international
organization. As a result, more cooperation can be expected on the
international sphere, and a broader consensus may be achieved around
the UDRP. Finally, as governments participate in the process, it is more
probable that consumers and other users can exert greater influence over
ICANN's decisions than the decisions of the totally private TPIs that
regulate privacy.
104. See ICANN, RULES FOR UDRP, supra note 62, para. 7 (stating that "[a] Panelist shall be
impartial and independent and shall have, before accepting appointment, disclosed to the Provider
any circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubt as to the Panelist's impartiality or
independence.").
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D. Comparison Between Privacy Rights TPIs and ICANN/UDRP
In order to compare private TPIs that regulate privacy on the Internet
with the UDRP, which regulates domain name disputes, I summarize
the characteristics of both systems in Table 1.
Table 1: TPI and ICANN Characteristics
Privacy
Issue Rights TPIs ICANN/UDRP
Cost Low Low
Enforcement Low High
Coverage Limited Global
Government Low Moderate
Participation
User Participation Low Low (though there is more
room for improvement)
International Low Moderate (but increasing)
Cooperation
Independence from Low Low (though there is
Private Firms' Interests increasing pressure to
change)
Transparency Low Moderate
Political Instruments No Yes (though user
(Board, Elections, etc.) participation is still limited)
I conclude that the UDRP is a closer example of a mixed regulatory
regime for the Internet than the totally private TPIs. However, ICANN
still has significant room for improvement, and perhaps we can expect
ICANN to continue evolving and modifying the nature of its regulatory
regime. The design of the regulatory regime that may result would then
be a consequence of bargaining among the different interest groups on
the Internet.
III. POLITICS ON THE INTERNET: EVOLUTION AND REFORM OF ICANN
In this section, I provide a case study of one of the most important yet
heavily criticized attempts to build an institution for Internet governance
based on a bottom-up approach. 10 5 In 1998, ICANN formed to manage
105. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (providing the critics' sources and support for
ICANN policies).
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online addresses and numbers on the Internet. 10 6  A non-profit
organization, ICANN was designed to be an instrument for managing
this system from a technical viewpoint, without government
intervention or political influence. 10 7 According to its creators, and
most importantly, the U.S. government, ICANN was the paradigm of
bottom-up regulation, in which the private sector could design its own
rules without political intervention. 108
Nonetheless, after ICANN existed for more than three years, its own
president initiated significant reforms based on the recognition that
ICANN could not fulfill its tasks without government and international
cooperation. 10 9  During most of 2002, different stakeholders within
ICANN debated the type and depth of these reforms. 110 Most of them
tried to avoid the inclusion of governments and politics in the
corporation. 11  As a result, the first proposal of wide government
intervention was changed toward a more cooperative role for the state,
more integrated international interests within the corporation, and a
continued reinforcement of private interests.
Even when the process of change succeeded in limiting government
intervention, it also transformed ICANN into a political organization, in
which the participating constituencies are the main actors shaping its
policymaking. ICANN's evolution had two main phases. In the first
106. See ICANN, ICANN HOMEPAGE, supra note 99 (providing information on the creation
of ICANN).
107. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,750 (June
10, 1998). The policy states in part:
The organizing documents (Charter, Bylaws, etc.) should provide that the new
corporation is governed on the basis of a sound and transparent decision-making
process, which protects against capture by a self-interested faction, and which provides
for robust, professional management of the new corporation. The new corporation
could rely on separate, diverse, and robust name and number councils responsible for
developing, reviewing, and recommending for the board's approval policy related to
matters within each council's competence. Such councils, if developed, should also
abide by rules and decision-making processes that are sound, transparent, protect
against capture by a self-interested party and provide an open process for the
presentation of petitions for consideration. The elected Board of Directors, however,
should have final authority to approve or reject policies recommended by the councils.
Id.
108. See id. (describing the need for private management of the Internet due to the rapid
expansion, globalization, and commercialization of the Internet).
109. See M. STUART LYNN, PRESIDENT'S REPORT: ICANN-THE CASE FOR REFORM, at
http://www.icann.org/generallynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm (Feb. 24, 2002) (describing the
problems ICANN faced without government support).
110. See ICANN, LINKS CONCERNING ICANN's 2002 EVOLUTION AND REFORM PROCESS, at
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reformlinks.htm (last updated Aug. 20, 2003) (providing
cite links to reports on the various perspectives on the ICANN reforms).
11. Id.
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phase, it evolved as a completely private corporation in which the
state's role was minimal. In the second phase, the participants within
ICANN tried to change its structure to allow more government and
international participation in its decision-making.
This change highlights the need for a consensual governance
mechanism for the Internet. Furthermore, I explain how ICANN's
political role has become as important as its technical role for the
governance of the Internet. Nonetheless, the political players of the
different ICANN constituencies tried to avoid reforms that undermined
their power. The resulting structure of ICANN eliminated most of the
changes proposed by the president; the structure now reflects the
bargaining process among the different participant constituencies and
the relative power of each group inside the corporation. As a result, we
cannot consider ICANN a technical management corporation, but rather
a political organization with well-specified constituencies and power
groups.
A. History and Political Structure of ICANN
Initially, because most of the Internet activity was limited to the
United States, the American government was in charge of the Internet's
functioning.1 1 2  Yet, the Internet quickly became an international
phenomenon, connecting people globally. Even so, the U.S.
government continued to provide the main instruments for its normal
operation. 113  It delegated domain-name system management to
Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), a private, for-profit firm under a
special contract with the government. 114 The management of numerical
addresses on the Internet was under the charge of the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority ("IANA"). 115
In 1997, the U.S. government explained the necessity of creating a
new institution, without ties to the government, which would provide
these services on the Internet. 116  Both the Department of
112. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,741-42
(describing the management of the Internet through the U.S. government support).
113. See id. (describing the necessity of the U.S. government to step down the management of
names and numbers, given the international character of the Internet).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 7, at 2. This document states:
Though government played a role in financing the initial development of the
Internet, its expansion has been driven primarily by the private sector. For electronic
commerce to flourish, the private sector must continue to lead. Innovation, expanded
services, broader participation, and lower prices will arise in a market-driven arena, not
in an environment that operates as a regulated industry.
[Vol. 35
2003] Private Internet Governance 121
Commerce" l 7 and the U.S. government itself believed that the best
regulatory regime for the Internet was a bottom-up system.11 8  The
government proposed the creation of a private, non-profit organization
for the management of names and addresses on the Internet. 119 ICANN
grew out of these proposals. 120
Accordingly, governments should encourage industry self-regulation wherever
appropriate and support the efforts of private sector organizations to develop
mechanisms to facilitate the successful operation of the Internet. Even where
collective agreements or standards are necessary, private entities should, where
possible, take the lead in organizing them. Where government action or
intergovernmental agreements are necessary, on taxation for example, private sector
participation should be a formal part of the policy making process.
Id.
117. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742. The policy states
as follows:
From its origins as a U.S.-based research vehicle, the Internet is rapidly becoming
an international medium for commerce, education and communication. The traditional
means of organizing its technical functions need to evolve as well. The pressures for
change are coming from many different quarters:
-There is widespread dissatisfaction about the absence of competition in domain
name registration.
-Conflicts between trademark holders and domain name holders are becoming
more common. Mechanisms for resolving these conflicts are expensive and
cumbersome.
-Many commercial interests, staking their future on the successful growth of the
Internet, are calling for a more formal and robust management structure.
-An increasing percentage of Internet users reside outside of the U.S., and those
stakeholders want to participate in Internet coordination.
-As Internet names increasingly have commercial value, the decision to add new
top-level domains cannot be made on an ad hoc basis by entities or individuals that are
not formally accountable to the Internet community.
-As the Internet becomes commercial, it becomes less appropriate for U.S.
research agencies to direct and fund these functions.
Id.
118. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (stating that governments should encourage
private sector oversight of the Internet).
119. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,749. The policy
states:
As set out below, the U.S. Government is prepared to recognize, by entering into
agreement with, and to seek international support for, a new, not-for-profit corporation
formed by private sector Internet stakeholders to administer policy for the Internet
name and address system. Under such agreement(s) or understanding(s), the new
corporation would undertake various responsibilities for the administration of the
domain name system now performed by or on behalf of the U.S. Government or by
third parties under arrangements or agreements with the U.S. Government. The U.S.
Government would also ensure that the new corporation has appropriate access to
needed databases and software developed under those agreements.
Id.
120. See ICANN, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED
NAMES AND NUMBERS, art. 3, at http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm (Nov. 21, 1998)
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Since then, ICANN has managed Internet names and numbers and
the proposal of policies to resolve problems and conflicts in this arena.
This action has not been limited to technological matters, but also
political ones, since the Board was concerned with creating an
institutional structure that facilitated the participation of different
constituencies in ICANN. 121 As a result, the corporation has become a
point of convergence for debate on most policies regarding addresses
and numbers on the Internet, and it has been subject to pressure from
many interest groups and countries. Among the successes of ICANN, I
note the establishment of the UDRP, the creation of other top-level
domain names, and the expansion of its influence all over the world.
122
However, ICANN has failed to create a forum for the many
constituencies on the Internet. 123  As a result, there has been a
movement to urge changes to the political mechanisms within
ICANN.124
B. Political Evolution and Structure of ICANN
Since its creation, ICANN's structure has gradually evolved to fulfill
its initial goals. Most changes that took place between its creation in
1998 and up to 2002 were intended to provide a governance structure
inside the organization that made it possible for different groups and
constituencies to participate in the policymaking process.1
25
ICANN was created with an initial board of directors ("Initial
Board"), composed of nine people from the At-Large members of
ICANN, with authority to manage and develop ICANN's main
(stating that "the corporation shall ... pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the
burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the
Internet").
121. See infra Part III.B (discussing the historical and political evolution of ICANN's
governing body).
122. But see infra Part IIJ.C (discussing how these successes have been limited in scope).
123. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (noting the decreased role for At-Large
Members following the most recent rounds of ICANN reforms); see also infra Part III.C
(observing that while "[t]he private sector consolidated its political position within ICANN's
structure," users of the Internet "have lost their prerogative to elect At-Large members directly by
popular vote," and that "[w]hile reformers initially tried to move toward a more participative
environment with governments and other Internet users, powerful constituencies within ICANN
prevented major reforms").
124. This movement can be described as a top-down reform, since it was the president of
ICANN who proposed to change the way the corporation was working. See supra note 109 and
accompanying text (first describing the reforms initiated by ICANN's president); see also notes
136-45 and accompanying text (discussing the president's proposal in greater detail).
125. See ICANN, BYLAWS ARCHIVES, at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/ (last
updated June 28, 2003) (showing the different changes in the bylaws of the corporation).
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structure. 126 As shown in Figure 1, in the first bylaws enacted by the
Initial Board, ICANN consisted of a board of directors and three
supporting organizations that contained the main constituencies with
interests in ICANN's activities. 12
7
I igure 1: Initial Structre of ICANN I
cnnittee
Advisor Gmnttee enFb-
The board of directors ("Board") included nineteen directors elected
by the Supporting Organizations and by the At-Large members of
ICANN. 128 Three Advisory Committees 129 aided the Board in its
126. ICANN, BYLAWS FOR THE INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND
NUMBERS, at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-06nov98.htm (Nov. 6, 1998).
Except as otherwise provided in the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws
(including Section l(c) of Article VI which sets forth responsibilities of Supporting
Organizations), the powers of the Corporation will be exercised, its property controlled
and its business and affairs conducted by or under the direction of the Board.
Id. art. IV, § 1(a).
127. See id. art. VI, §3(a) (stating that there shall be at least the following three Supporting
Organizations: Address Supporting Organization, Domain Name Supporting Organization, and
Protocol Supporting Organization).
128. See id. art. V, §§ 3-4 (outlining the numbers of directors who can be nominated from a
committee and elected).
129. Id. art. VII, § 3. The three Advisory Committees were: the Government Advisory
Committee ("GAC"), consisting of international governments, multinational governmental
organizations, and treaty organizations; the DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee
("RSSAC"), consisting of the organizations responsible for the operation of the world's thirteen
root name servers and other organizations related to the root server system; and the Advisory
2003]
tI CMo s, r~m sstf
124 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 35
policymaking process. 130 The initial bylaws did not define a specific
composition of the different Supporting Organizations, leaving this task
open to future reviews by the Board upon consultation with the specific
groups and constituencies. 131
From the creation of the first bylaws by the Initial Board, a process of
defining the governing structure of the organization was set in
motion. 132 After several reviews of the bylaws and the creation of the
different organizations planned by the bylaws, the first structural
process for organizing ICANN culminated in the year 2000 (see Figure
2).133 As one can see, Councils and General Assemblies were well-
defined as the main policymaking bodies in each supporting
organization structure. 134 These organizations were thought to be both
part of the Board and capable of providing policy advice to the Board.
In the case of the At-Large members, a general election took place in
Committee on Membership ("ACM"), a temporary committee with members appointed by the
Board. Id.
130. Id. Under the bylaws, GAC's role was described as follows:
[The GAC] should consider and provide advice on the activities of the Corporation as
they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an
interaction between the Corporation's policies and various laws, and international
agreements. The Board will notify the chairman of the [GAC] of any proposal for
which it seeks comments under Article III, Section 3(b) and will consider any response
to that notification prior to taking action.
Id. art. VII, § 3(a). RSSAC's role was defined as follows:
The responsibility of [RSSAC] shall be to advise the Board about the operation of the
root name servers of the domain name system. [RSSAC] should consider and provide
advice on the operational requirements of root name servers, including host hardware
capacities, operating systems and name server software versions, network connectivity
and physical environment. [RSSAC] should examine and advise on the security
aspects of the root name server system. Further, [RSSAC] should review the number,
location, and distribution of root name servers considering the total system
performance, robustness, and reliability.
Id. art. VII, § 3(b). The ACM's role was described as follows: "The responsibility of the
Advisory Committee on Membership shall be to advise the Board on the creation of the
membership structure called for in Section 9(c) of Article V [At-Large members]." Id. art. VII,
§ 3(c).
131. Id. art. VI (describing the Supporting Organizations and the powers of the Board to add
additional supporting organizations by vote).
132. See ICANN, BYLAWS ARCHIVES, supra note 125 (showing the different reforms of the
corporation's structure since its creation).
133. See generally ICANN, BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES
AND NUMBERS, at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-16julOO.htm (July 16,
2000) (illustrating structural changes and containing resulting amendments through July 2000).
134. Id.; see also infra fig. 2.
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2001, in which registered Internet users from all over the world elected
their representatives to the Board.13
5
Fig 2. ICANN Sre Year 2001
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In February 2002, ICANN's president proposed a set of structural
changes, particularly with respect to Board composition and election of
directors. Among the factors mentioned as supporting these changes,
the president noted the following:
135. See generally ICANN, AT-LARGE MEMBERSHIP SITE, at http://members.icann.org/
activestats.html (Oct. 10, 2000) (providing demographic information about the At-Large
membership).
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ICANN is still not fully organized, and it is certLinly not yet capable
of shouldering the entire responsibility of global DNS management
and coordination. ICANN has also not shown that it can be effective,
nimble, and quick to react to problems. ICANN is overburdened with
process, and at the same time underfunded and understaffed. For
these and other more fundamental reasons, ICANN in its current form
has not become the effective steward of the global Internet's naming
and address allocation systems as conceived by its founders. Perhaps
even more importantly, the passage of time has not increased the
confidence that it can meet its original expectations and hopes. 136
This short paragraph summarizes the main problems that ICANN
faced just two years after its founding. The view that change was
necessary to better address the organization's issues was widely
accepted.
As for the direction of this change, the president noted that a purely
private agency was impractical. 137 The president blamed most of
ICANN's failures on its pure bottom-up organizational design. While
he advocated a more active role for government, he was nevertheless
reluctant to follow a pure top-down approach. This proposal recognized
a need to move toward a mixed system with cooperation among various
governments and the private sector. 138
The newly proposed ICANN structure emerged from this setup of a
mixed organization with active participation from governments and the
private sector. First, the board of directors became a board of trustees
with fifteen members: five nominated by governments, one from each
geographic area; five nominated by a nominating committee and
confirmed by the Board of Trustees; and five ex officio trustees
integrated by the president and the chairs of the Policy Councils and the
Technical Advisory Committee. 139 The Supporting Organizations were
replaced by Policy Councils. These Councils are divided into the
Address and Numbering Policy Council, the Generic TLD Names
Policy Council, and the Geographic TLD Names Policy Council.
The new proposal considered the creation of the Government and
Technical Standing Advisory Committees that would advise the Board
regarding policy decisions. Finally, two more technical committees
were proposed-the Root Name Server Operations Committee and the
Security Committee. Furthermore, the figure of an Ombudsman was
proposed. This Ombudsman would be in charge of public comments
136. LYNN, supra note 109.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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and general transparency of all ICANN operations.
140
the new structure of ICANN following this proposal.
Figure 3 shows
Figure 3: Proposed New Structure I
Name Server
Oprtos omte
Secrt ommitte
ICANN's proposed structure strongly differs from the actual structure
described in Figure 2. As one can see, the number of directors, now
named trustees, decreased from nineteen to fifteen. 14 1  Furthermore,
election directly by the governments replaced direct elections by the At-
140. Id.
141. Id. ("The current Board, I believe, is somewhat larger than desirable, and thus I would
reduce the new Board of Trustees to 15 people.").
20031
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Large members. 142  The Supporting Organizations are replaced by
Councils, which now elect just one Trustee each. 143  The final five
trustees are elected by the newly created Nominating Committee, which
directly depends on the Board. 144
The proposed structure is more centralized than the previous one, and
the Board's power is increased. Now the Board clearly represents
governments, different private sectors (through the Councils), and some
independent Trustees who would be elected by the Nominating
Committee. Governments and technical organizations also have an
important role in advising the Board through the two new Advisory
Committees and the two non-voting liaisons on the Board. 145 As a
consequence, ICANN's proposed political structure represents a
stronger role for both governments and the private sector and less
participation for independent Internet users. If there was a hope to
construct a democratic organization for names and numbers on the
Internet, in which users could vote and participate directly, this proposal
went in the opposite direction by constructing a new board of trustees
more in control of the situation and with the ability to respond directly
to governments and the private sector. Nonetheless, this proposal was
142. Id.
Obviously, this proposed Board of Trustees, while still representative of the ICANN
stakeholder communities, is largely not the product of elections. This is because the
principal objective is to produce an effective Board of Trustees, not to allocate seats to
interest groups or constituencies, or to replicate online the vast array of governmental
institutions needed to assure fair elections. Of course, it will be critical that all portions
of the community feel that their interests are understood and given due consideration
by the Board of Trustees, but that does not mean that the selection process must
inevitably be electoral, in the sense of governmental elections based on universal
suffrage.
Id.
143. Id.
The current ICANN concept is based on the notion of "bottom-up" policy
development, with the Supporting Organizations responsible for the development of
policy and the Board theoretically just the implementing device for those policies. In
hindsight, the notion of truly "bottom-up" consensus decision-making simply has not
proven workable, partly because the process is too exposed to capture by special
interests and partly because ICANN relies entirely on volunteers to do all the work.
Furthermore, those who are affected by policy decisions should have a clear role in
generating the record on which those policy decisions are based and in providing
thoughtful advice to the Board of Trustees.
This analysis leads me to suggest the replacement of the current Supporting
Organizations with several Policy Councils. These would include an Address and
Numbering Policy Council, a Generic TLD Names Policy Council, and a Geographic
TLD Names Policy Council.
Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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widely discussed and criticized and the bylaws that were finally
approved were far from this initiative.
As a result of this proposal, in March 2002, the Board renamed the
Committee on Restructuring, created in November 2001, as the
Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform ("ERC"). 146  The ERC
began to work on the proposed changes, trying to address all the
concerns and proposals from different constituencies and groups with
interests on ICANN functioning. 147
Finally, in June 2002, the Committee published A Blueprint for
Reform.148  In this document, the Committee elaborated on the
president's proposal, introduced some changes, and recommended its
approval to the Board. After much debate, the ERC changed much of
the president's initial proposal. In the Blueprint, the government's role
decreased, but was still more important than it had been before the
reforms. 149  Government representatives were assigned to every
146. See ICANN, PRELIMINARY REPORT, ICANN MEETING IN ACCRA, at
http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-14marO2.htm (Mar. 14, 2002) (stating the resolution
to change the committee's name). The main tasks of the new Committee were:
* monitoring and providing reports to the Board on possible changes to the structure
of ICANN;
* evaluating and making recommendations to the Board concerning any specific
proposals or applications to the Board that would or could affect the structure of
ICANN or the composition of the Board;
* considering input from the community on reform of ICANN's structure and
consulting with specific stakeholders for clarifications or further input; and
* preparing recommendations to the Board regarding, first and foremost, a statement
of ICANN's essential functions and its mission, as well as the appropriate structure of
ICANN and the processes by which it should function.
ICANN, COMMITTEE ON ICANN EVOLUTION AND REFORM, at
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/ (last modified Aug. 20, 2003) [hereinafter
ICANN, COMMITTEE ON ICANN].
147. See COMM. ON ICANN EVOLUTION AND REFORM, ICANN: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM,
at http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reformlblueprint-20junO2.htm (June 20, 2002)
[hereinafter BLUEPRINT] (summarizing the recommendations of the ERC to the ICANN Board of
Directors).
148. See id.
149. Id.
To strengthen the GAC's integration into ICANN and to strengthen representation
of the public interest, the GAC should appoint (a) a non-voting liaison to the Board (b)
one delegate to the Nominating Committee, and (c) non-voting liaisons to each of the
SO [Supporting Organization] Councils and to the RSSAC, the TAC [Technical
Advisory Committee], and the SAC [Security Advisory Committee]. The GAC would
decide whether or not any or all of these liaisons are members of the GAC. In each
case, the liaisons should have sufficient expertise to participate effectively in each of
these bodies.
The GAC should be requested to appoint a contact individual to coordinate when
necessary between the IANA and particular government officials when there are
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organization in ICANN. In this way, the Committee sought to tie the
governments to all policymaking areas.
Pressure from different constituencies and organizations protected
some of the old structures from reform. 150 As a result, the Address
Supporting Organization ("ASO") and the GNSO (previously, the
Domain Name Supporting Organization) were preserved from the
changes proposed previously. Furthermore, the proposal left open the
door to a new agreement among ccTLDs, International Governments,
and the ICANN Board in order to create a new structure inside the
corporation that better addressed the interests of ccTLDs. 15 1  This
ongoing debate emerged from the pressure from the country code
managers and the aim of expanding ICANN into the international
arena.152 Further, the Protocol Advisory Organization was eliminated,
and the organizations participating in it were redirected to the Technical
Advisory Committee. One of the most important changes was the
creation of a more ambitious Nominating Committee, with seventeen
members coming from different constituencies and groups. Moreover,
this committee had the power to name more than half of the members of
the Board. 153
In sum, the ERC's proposal reflected a compromise between the deep
reforms proposed by the ICANN president and the interests of different
organizations and constituencies with a stake in the current structure
delegations or redelegations pending, and to provide a focus for advice and information
to other government officials. The GAC should be requested to participate in a dialog
with ICANN and the ccTLD community to understand what steps might be taken to
facilitate the consummation of agreements between ICANN and the ccTLDs that
provide a framework of accountability, and other aspects of integration of the ccTLD
community in ways that reflect its global diversity ....
Id.
150. See ICANN, COMMITIEE ON ICANN, supra note 146.
151. BLUEPRINT, supra note 147.
In the original Lynn document "ICANN: A Case for Reform," one problem that
was highlighted was the challenge associated with consummating stakeholder
agreements. This problem has not been addressed thus far in detail in the work of the
Committee on Evolution and Reform. Nowhere is this problem more complex than in
the case of reaching agreements with ccTLDs, although some progress has been made
and more can be anticipated. ICANN operates within the framework of ICP- I [Internet
Coordination Policy].
As a step towards addressing this issue and possibly considering whether policy
changes may be required, the Committee on Evolution and Reform recommends that
the Board encourage the GAC and delegates from the global ccTLD community to
explore possible paths to resolution of this problem.
Id.
152. See ICANN, COMMITTEE ON ICANN, supra note 146.
153. See LYNN, supra note 109 (stating that the nominating committee elects five trustees).
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and policymaking process of the corporation. Although much of the
relationship between the ICANN Board and the groups that are part of
the corporation is still under discussion, in October 2002, the Board
approved the new, modified bylaws. 154 The structure of ICANN was
finally defined as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Structure of ICANN According to the Last Bylaws
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154. For the minutes of the October 28-31, 2002, meetings, which approved the new bylaws,
see ICANN, ICANN MEETINGS IN SHANGHAI, at http://www.icann.org/shanghai/ (last updated
Apr. 11, 2003).
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If one compares this final structure of ICANN with the president's
initial proposal in Figure 3, we can see that there are many changes.
First, the role of the government is reduced. 155 In the first proposal, the
GAC was to elect five directors, or one-third of the total Board. In the
final structure, the GAC does not elect any directors. 156 Nonetheless,
there is an improvement in the role of governments, since the GAC now
has more direct participation in all the groups of ICANN. 157
Second, the role of the ccTLDs improved through the creation of a
new supporting organization that represents them. 158  This marks an
opening of ICANN to international cooperation and a more active role
for the international community in ICANN policies.
Third, the ASO and GNSO improved their situations by avoiding
transformation into Councils and electing two directors each, instead of
one. 159 Further, both can participate in the Nominating Committee and
thereby gain the opportunity to influence the election of the other eight
Directors. 160
Fourth, the Protocol Supporting Organization ("PSO") was
eliminated in the first proposal and also in the final bylaws. 161 This
meant a loss of power for the technical organizations that took part in
the political structure of the first ICANN. Now, these organizations
merely advise the Board. Fifth, the At-Large community lost ground
from the first proposed design. 162 The initial proposal intended the
Nominating Committee to elect five At-Large directors. In the final
version of the bylaws, the At-Large community was left with a newly
created At-Large Advisory Committee, which can elect five delegates to
the Nominating Committee that now represents many other
constituencies in addition to the At-Large members. 163 It appears that
through the bargaining process, those organizations and constituencies
155. See ICANN, BYLAWS, art. XI, §§ 1-2, at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-
bylawslbylaws-26jun03.htm (June 26, 2003) (outlining the role of the Governmental Advisory
Committee).
156. Id.
157. Id. (outlining that the GAC "shall" appoint a non-voting liaison to the ICANN Board of
Directors and one non-voting liaison to the ICANN Nominating Committee, and that the GAC
may also designate non-voting liaisons to each of the Supporting Organization Councils and
Advisory Committees).
158. Id. art. IX (stating that the membership of the ccNSO shall consist of ccTLD managers).
159. Id. arts. VIII, X (stating that the GNSO appoints two directors while the ASO "shall
select Directors to those seats on the Board designated to be filled by the ASO").
160. Id. art. X.
161. Id. art XX, § 6.
162. Id. art. XI.
163. Id. art. XI, § 2(4).
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that were better structured and coordinated than the At-Large
community undermined the initial powers granted by the first reform to
the At-Large members. This should be viewed against a backdrop of
the first reform, which had already decreased the power that the At-
Large community enjoyed in the old bylaws and in ICANN's
structure. 164
ICANN's reform is an example of a political process used to reach a
consensus and power equilibrium within the organization. From this
analysis, I conclude that ICANN is by no means just a technical
organization assigned the task of technical management of Internet
addresses and numbers, but rather a political organization with the
power to create policies for the functioning of the Internet. Moreover, it
is now a political body with different groups and constituencies with a
stake in its policies, all interacting with each other.
C. Results of the Reform
The U.S. government sought the creation of ICANN as a needed step
toward promoting international cooperation regarding the governance of
the Internet and, at the same time, creating a bottom-up system in which
government intervention was limited, if not eliminated. ICANN's
evolution shows that the corporation slowly departed from its mere
technical role and became a more political entity, in which participants
from all groups and constituencies tried to reach consensus about the
policies to be applied. Furthermore, the timid success of ICANN's first
three years showed that a pure bottom-up model is not able to regulate
the Internet efficiently, as the private sector is the main beneficiary of
the political structure of the corporation. As the reform movement
began inside the corporation, the different constituencies tried to exploit
this situation by gaining power positions in the new structure. The
initial proposal recognized a bigger role for international governments
as a way to overcome the structural deficiencies of a private institution.
However, the political strength of different groups and constituencies
inside the corporation negated some of the initial reforms and produced
a totally new structure.
The private sector consolidated its political position within ICANN's
structure. GNSO constituencies gained important power spaces in the
new design. ASO members had some gains, but more importantly they
are still debating their future relationship with ICANN and the ccNSO.
The ccNSO, recognized as an independent supporting organization, will
164. See ICANN, AT-LARGE MEMBERSHIP SITE, supra note 135 (outlining the powers of At-
Large Community prior to the adoption of the final bylaws).
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provide new ways of cooperating with international organizations and
governments.
Internet users have lost their prerogative to elect At-Large members
directly by popular vote. The new bylaws created a Nominating
Committee, which undermined most of the original power enjoyed by
the At-Large members. PSO members lost most of their power inside
the ICANN organization. The PSO was eliminated and its members
transferred to the Technical Liaison Group ("TLG") with only an
advisory role and with slight participation in the naming of Board
members.
The process of change permits one to examine the political strength
of different groups and also shows how ICANN has become more of a
political instrument instead of a technical corporation. An indication of
this is that most of the debate on ICANN's reform centered on how to
divide the power inside the corporation, more specifically inside the
Board, and the capacity of each group to enforce its policies.
The government gained more space in policymaking. Through the
reinforcement of the GAC as an advisory institution inside all major
groups and constituencies of the corporation, ICANN initiated a new
relationship with government, which could be positive regarding the
implementation of future policies.
Reforms enhanced international cooperation. The creation of a
supporting organization for the ccNSO and the incentives for
international governments to participate in a better GAC opened the
gates of ICANN to wide international participation in policymaking.
This step could provide effective power to enforce policies throughout
the Internet, enhancing the power of ICANN as a regulator.
Finally, we are now presented with a more open model for regulation,
in which more than just one sector is taken into account. This will
provide better opportunities to create a more effective regulatory regime
for the Internet. Nonetheless, those groups that have lost in the process
should be accommodated in the new structure to provide better
participation and improve overall decision-making. This tendency to
concentrate decision-making also provides ICANN with a lower
dispersion of power and more effective decision-making, since all
groups are focused in small organizations inside ICANN. While
reformers initially tried to move toward a more participative
environment with governments and other Internet users, powerful
constituencies within ICANN prevented major reforms. The new
organization's efficacy will depend on how the specific structure and
dispersion of power provides opportunity for consensus and how groups
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left outside the policymaking process can be accommodated in the new
structure. In the end, with reform and political struggle behind it, what
is finally unmasked is the fundamental political nature of ICANN. As
in every political institution, its legitimacy and survival depends on the
access the different constituencies are accorded with respect to
policymaking. In short, a more open and publicly accountable
institution is necessary for constructing an effective governance body
for the Internet.
While not all countries accept ICANN jurisdiction, some important
countries do accept ICANN's jurisdiction. Furthermore, even if most
countries do not accept ICANN's jurisdiction, they have designed
dispute-resolution systems that are a reflection of ICANN's own UDRP.
As a result, ICANN's influence is established by the generation of
followers among the ccTLDs. For example, the United Kingdom has a
dispute-resolution system similar to ICANN, with a winning rate for
complainants of close to eighty percent, also similar to the UDRP. 165
Other countries, like Mexico, have a dispute-resolution system in which
the only provider is WIPO. 166 In Asia, the new provider associated
with ICANN also controls the ccTLDs for important countries, like
China. 167
As a result, even though ICANN is not directly involved in dispute
resolution, most countries have in place such a procedure, based on the
experience of ICANN. Furthermore, the creation of the new ccNSO
will provide ccTLDs with more voice in ICANN decision-making and,
as a result, we may see rules that will have general application. Indeed,
165. See NOMINET.UK, GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF STATISTICS, at
http://www.nominet.org.uk/DisputeResolution/Statistics/GraphicalRepresentationOfStatistics.htm
I (last visited Dec. 29, 2003) (recording an approximately eighty percent win rate for
complainants under Nominet.uk's dispute resolution system); ICANN, STATISTICAL SUMMARY
OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY, at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last updated Dec. 17, 2003) (recording an
eighty-one percent win rate for complainants). See generally NOMINET.UK, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SERVICE (DRS) POLICY, at http://www.nominet.org.uk/DisputeResolution/
DrsPolicy/DrsPolicy.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2003); NOMINET.UK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SERVICE (DRS) PROCEDURE, at http://www.nominet.org.uk/DisputeResolution/DrsProcedure/
DrsProcedure.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2003).
166. See POLTICA DE SOLUCION DE CONTROVERSIAS EN MATERIA DE NOMBRES DE
DOMINIO PARA .MX (LDRP), at http://www.nic.mx/nic-html/PoliticasLDRP.htm#panelistas
(last visited Dec. 29, 2003) (providing only links to WIPO under its list of dispute resolution
service providers, located under Appendix A).
167. See generally ASIAN DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTRE (ADNDRC), at
http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/index.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2002); see also ICANN, ICANN
Announces New Dispute Resolution Provider in the Asia Pacific Region, at
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-03decO1.htm (Dec. 3, 2001) (describing the
ADNDRC).
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as a suggestion for future work, it would be very interesting to do a
comparative analysis of the different dispute resolution systems in the
ccTLDs and compare them with ICANN's UDRP.
Professor Froomkin also notes that the reforms in ICANN are not
different from the proposal of the former president of ICANN, Stuart
Lynn. 168 Mr. Lynn did try to introduce the government into ICANN's
structure, which would have changed the way ICANN functions today.
But the already entrenched interests in ICANN resisted the changes and
preserved their power. Understanding these changes is important.
Without discussing whether Lynn was right, it is easy to see that
ICANN is a political structure in which political and economic interests
give shape to its policymaking.
IV. CONCLUSION
This work offers an analysis of private regulation of electronic
commerce through the introduction of two case studies-the regulation
of online privacy rights by BBBOnline and the ICANN's UDRP regime
for domain-name disputes. Private industry insists that a self-regulatory
approach has been successful in providing adequate privacy protection
to consumers on the Internet. It claims that the government should not
intervene in this issue and must permit Internet users to decide the
relevant rules. This bottom-up regime is based on TPIs that generate
and manage voluntary self-regulatory programs. After studying some
of these programs, and BBBOnLine in particular, I found numerous,
somewhat predictable failures. TPIs are incapable of providing
effective enforcement throughout the Internet. Their limited efforts are
circumscribed by the same jurisdiction as the government's. They are
also unable to overcome collective action problems, as the number of
firms associated with these TPIs is minimal. Finally, and most
importantly, they rely on government as an enforcer of last resort when
their efforts produce no results. As a result, government intervention is
imperative to improve the functioning of this regulatory regime. More
importantly, if actions in this direction are not taken, the pendulum
could very well swing towards the other end, prompting a change to a
top-down regulatory regime that then brings along its own well-
recognized limitations.
The UDRP system is somewhat closer to an optimal mixed system,
but is nevertheless deeply flawed. Government and user participation is
more significant under this system. Furthermore, there is a higher level
168. Froomkin, Commentary, supra note 10, at 151-53 & n.73.
[Vol. 35
Private Internet Governance
of international participation in advising and decision-making, as
compared with a pure bottom-up system. Yet, this mixed system is
beset with problems, like bias toward complainants and low user
participation, and further legitimacy in the international arena is
necessary. It may still be possible to transform ICANN into an
instrument that provides consensus at the international level and
promotes effective Internet regulation. This implies a further deepening
of the mixed regime, combining top-down and bottom-up regulatory
approaches within ICANN.
As might be expected, the construction of a regulatory regime based
on a bottom-up approach cannot succeed in regulating the Internet
effectively. In the case of ICANN, the president of the corporation tried
to move toward a more cooperative regime with the government. Yet,
political interests within ICANN reduced the thrust of these proposed
reforms. In the end, we are now left with a corporation in which
governments and international actors have more say, but a corporation
that is, nevertheless, still controlled by those constituencies that
successfully blocked most reforms. This is a clear indication that
ICANN is now a political institution rather than a technical group, and it
must, therefore, respond and accommodate the interests and preferences
of its diverse member groups.
Based on the insights from the two case studies, it is possible to
define at least a minimal role for government as one that is intended to
solve problems in these self-regulatory approaches by setting minimum
baseline standards for rights and regulations, preventing the capture of
private regulators through meaningful oversight, increasing the
participation of firms in private regulatory initiatives, and also serving
as the enforcer of last resort.
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